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ABSTRACT
This Article presents the results of an empirical survey examining the disposition of federal claims after Younger abstention litigation. It traces the expansion of
the Younger doctrine over the past several decades and explains how it featured
prominently in the judicial parity debate that occurred in earnest from the late 1970s
until the early 1990s. It notes that despite the emergence of empiricism as a tool in
that debate, no one has examined how federal claims are actually being resolved in
post-Younger proceedings at the state and federal levels. The Article then undertakes
that inquiry, observing a federal claim success rate in post-abstention proceedings in
federal court nearly three times as high as the corresponding success rate at the state
level. It compares these findings to other empirical comparative studies outside of the
abstention context and concludes by proposing possible explanations for the results.

INTRODUCTION
Richard Canatella, a California lawyer, filed a federal lawsuit against the
State Bar of California in March 2000 alleging that certain provisions of the
bar’s code of conduct governing attorney speech were impermissibly vague and
overbroad in violation of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 Randy
Bendel, another California attorney, learned of the lawsuit through a published
interlocutory appeal.2 In April 2002, the state bar began disciplinary proceedings against Bendel over his accusations of crimes, improper judicial conduct,
and bias on the part of state judges, as well as his attacks on their honesty,
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado. B.S., B.S., B.A., 1998, Southern Methodist
University; J.D., 2001, University of Chicago Law School. Any opinions expressed herein
are mine alone and do not represent the views of the Colorado Attorney General or
Department of Law. I must thank Professors Joshua Fairfield of Washington & Lee, Michael
Solimine of the University of Cincinnati, and Eli Wald of the University of Denver for their
extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are mine. I would also
like to thank Professors Bill Henderson and Georgene Vairo for their words of
encouragement and advice. Finally, I am deeply indebted to my wife for her patience and
invaluable “in house” editing during this process. This is dedicated to her and our three
children.
1 Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing lawsuit).
Canatella’s complaint was dismissed on February 2005. See Canatella v. Stovitz, 213 Fed.
Appx. 515, 517–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal).
2 Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005).
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character, or demeanor.3 Bendel moved to intervene in Canatella’s lawsuit,
asserting the same First Amendment claims.4
The state bar defendants asked the federal trial court to dismiss Bendel’s
complaint-in-intervention pursuant to the abstention doctrine announced in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which generally requires federal courts
to decline to adjudicate the applicable federal claims in favor of ongoing parallel state judicial proceedings under certain circumstances.5 The trial court
granted this motion, and Bendel appealed.6 The Ninth Circuit ran through the
Younger analysis and held: (1) the state bar case constituted an ongoing judicial
proceeding; (2) regulating attorney misconduct was an important state interest;
and (3) Bendel had adequate opportunity to assert his federal defenses in a
competent and unbiased state forum.7 The court thus upheld the abstention
decision and affirmed the denial of the intervention motion.8
Bendel was undeterred. After briefing the appeal, but prior to the Ninth
Circuit decision, he argued these same constitutional claims in the state bar
proceedings.9 The Hearing Department of the State Bar Court issued its final
decision on May 19, 2004.10 It decided against Bendel on numerous nonspeech
grounds and ordered that he be suspended for six months, placed on probation
for two years, and that he pay all restitution and comply with all other sanctions
pending against him.11 Yet Bendel’s argument that his remarks were protected
by the First Amendment was more successful. The bar court concluded that
virtually all of the allegedly improper statements fell in the category of “opinion based on an assumed set of facts,” and as such were protected speech.12 It
held that Bendel’s “inappropriate” statements did not constitute actionable conduct, opining that “it is fundamental that we preserve the right of our citizens to
speak freely about government officials, even if not done in particularly good
taste.”13
This partial success was a small consolation for Bendel. He remained suspended for six months, and it is unclear whether he ever resumed his law practice. In any event, he failed to comply with the terms of his probation, and the
California state bar revoked it on April 4, 2006.14 It suspended Bendel again
3

Randy E. Bendel, Hearing Dep’t of Cal. State Bar Ct., Case No. 00-O-13391-RAH, at
1–17 (May 19, 2004), http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/00-O-13391.pdf.
4 See Canatella, 404 F.3d at 1109 (describing motion).
5 See infra Part I.B for a detailed discussion of the Younger abstention prerequisites.
6 Canatella, 404 F.3d at 1109.
7 Id. at 1110–12.
8 Id. at 1117.
9 Bendel, Case No. 00-O-13391-RAH, at 18–34.
10 Id. at 1.
11 Id. at 43–44. The bar court found Bendel culpable of the following: (a) employing means
inconsistent with the truth and seeking to mislead a judge; (b) failing to obey a court order;
(c) maintaining an unjust action; and (d) malicious prosecution. Id. at 18, 20, 31, 33.
12 Id. at 29.
13 Id. at 29–30.
14 Randy E. Bendel, Hearing Dep’t of Cal. State Bar Ct., Case No. 06-PM-10698-RAP, at 1
(Apr. 4, 2006), http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-PM-10698.pdf.
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for two full years.15 He was the subject of another State Bar Court order on
December 6, 2007,16 and was disbarred on May 30, 2008.17
Bendel’s case may not be remarkable for its merits, but it is unique for one
main reason: the Ninth Circuit opinion is the only reported decision identified
by the methodology used in this Article during the 2004 to 2006 period in
which (i) a federal court abstained from hearing a federal claim in favor of a
state tribunal pursuant to the Younger doctrine, and (ii) the claimant was clearly
successful on his or her federal claim at the state level.18 In the other fifteen
pro-Younger reported decisions from 2004 to 2006 selected by this methodology in which the parallel state forum identifiably resolved the asserted federal
claim, the claimant lost every time.19 This should be contrasted with reported
decisions refusing to abstain under Younger during that period.20 In the 31 antiabstention cases included by this Article’s methodology in which the federal
claim was identifiably decided, the claimant won in federal court a much more
generous 38.7 percent of the time.21
The tiny success rate for federal claimants proceeding in state tribunals
after22 Younger abstention during 2004–2006 may be a modest fluke or outlier,
but not by much. A federal claim’s chances of success in a state forum after
Younger abstention always seem disproportionately low, at least during the
time period from 1995 to 2006.23 Based on the survey of several hundred federal trial and appellate decisions reported in this Article during those years,
parties asserting such claims in post-Younger proceedings prevailed a small
fraction (15.1 percent) of the time.24 In comparison, federal courts retaining a
case after declining abstention during that period ultimately sided with the federal claimant far more frequently (43.6 percent of the time)25—nearly three
times as often.
This is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, although the success
rate of federal claimants who stay in federal court is consistent with what others
have found outside of the abstention context, the chances of success for those
15

Id.
Randy E. Bendel, Hearing Dep’t of Cal. State Bar Ct., Case No. 07-N-12245-DFM, at 1
(Dec. 6, 2007), http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/07-N-12245.pdf.
17 See Randy E. Bendel — #130569, CAL. ST. BAR, http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/130569 (last visited Dec. 11, 2011).
18 Infra Table A.
19 Infra Table A.
20 Infra Table B.
21 Infra Table B.
22 The term “after” may be confusing in this context. Younger abstention requires that state
proceedings must be ongoing when the federal litigation is commenced (or at least before
there are federal proceedings of substance on the merits). See infra Part I.B.1. They need not
be still ongoing when an abstention request is granted; indeed, it is conceivable that the state
tribunal may have decided the federal claim by then, with the federal court effectively
abstaining in favor of a known outcome. For ease of reference, however, I characterize all
state proceedings that are the basis for abstaining as taking place “after” abstention.
23 Infra Table A.
24 Infra Part III.C.
25 Infra Part III.C.
16
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relegated to a state tribunal after abstention are not.26 There must be something
peculiar about Younger cases, then, explaining why state tribunals appear substantially less receptive to federal claims after abstention than those brought
directly when compared to federal courts. Second, the requirement that a litigant must have an adequate opportunity to pursue a federal claim in the parallel
state forum is the most fundamental prerequisite of Younger abstention.27 The
disproportionately low federal claim success rate in post-abstention state proceedings thus begs a critical question: is the presumption against inadequacy
justified?
This Article is divided into five parts exploring many of these issues. Part
I examines the broad expansion of the Younger doctrine to its current scope.
Part II summarizes commentators’ views on whether federal claimants can ever
systematically receive a truly adequate hearing in state court, both in and out of
the abstention context. It emphasizes the close relationship between Younger
abstention and the parity debate that occurred in earnest from the late 1970s to
the early 1990s, and the emergence of empirical analysis as a controversial but
important tool in that conversation.
Part III-A observes that despite these last two important points, no one has
applied that sort of empirical analysis to Younger cases to determine how the
federal claims at issue are being resolved in post-abstention proceedings. Parts
III-B and -C attempt to fill in that gap by presenting the results of a survey
comparing the disposition of federal claims asserted in state tribunals or federal
court after Younger litigation from 1995 to 2006. They discuss the purpose of
the study, explain its methodology and typology, and attempt to highlight
potential methodological flaws. Part IV-A compares the results with existing
empirical studies examining how federal claims are resolved by state and federal courts generally. Part IV-B proposes potential explanations for the findings
and suggests future research ideas. Part V concludes by briefly discussing the
broad implications of the survey results.
I.

YOUNGER ABSTENTION: NOT SO EXTRAORDINARY, NOT SO NARROW

A. Legal Evolution of the Younger Abstention Doctrine
Abstention doctrines are judge-created tests employed by federal courts
that allow them to decline jurisdiction in cases or controversies where they
would otherwise be authorized by Article III to exercise it.28 Commentators
trace them back to the early English chancery courts, which would refuse to
26 See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213,
239–40 (1983) [hereinafter Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation]. The authors
found that constitutional claims succeeded 41 percent of the time in federal court and 32
percent of the time in state court.
27 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979) (state court adequacy is “the only pertinent
inquiry”); see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 626 (1981) (characterizing adequacy as the fundamental
prerequisite for Younger); Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1191, 1214 (1977) (adequacy is the “underpinning” of Younger).
28 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) (doctrine of
abstention is one in which a court may decline or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction).
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hear cases in situations where adjudication would be contrary to the public
interest.29 In the contemporary American context, abstention generally is
intended to minimize friction between federal and state courts.30
The Supreme Court characterizes abstention as “an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a [federal c]ourt to adjudicate a controversy properly [brought] before it.”31 Legal scholars nevertheless have attacked the
propriety and constitutionality of these doctrines, beginning especially in the
aftermath of the first controversial modern abstention decision, Railroad
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).32 Yet despite these
objections, most scholars will concede—perhaps grudgingly and perhaps not—
that abstention is here to stay.33
It would be nice to be able to base the court-created exceptions to federal
jurisdiction on a set of principles more specific and less amorphous than reducing federal-state friction, but this is impossible.34 Abstention is best and per29

See Webster C. Cash, III, Note, “Our Federalism” Out West: The Tenth Circuit and
Younger Abstention, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 669, 670 (2010) (discussing origins of abstention); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 571 (1985)
(exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the English Chancery court actually pre-dated the division of legal and equitable tribunals by the fifteenth century).
30 See, e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 n.6 (1994) (discussing references to federalstate “friction” in the abstention context).
31 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); accord
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)
(“[O]nly exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States.”).
32 These commentators cite the principle that federal courts have a “virtually unflagging”
duty to adjudicate Article III cases and controversies properly before them when Congress
has conveyed the necessary jurisdiction, see, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 716 (1996), and they view abstention as abdicating this obligation. See, e.g., Rex
E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and Abstention with
Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV 321, 337–38; Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J.
71, 72 (1984) [hereinafter Redish, Limits of the Judicial Function]; Georgene M. Vairo,
Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 211–12 (1989). Others argue that it violates constitutional separation-of-powers principles when courts decline jurisdiction expressly granted by
Congress. See Redish, Limits of the Judicial Function, supra, at 112; Donald H. Zeigler, A
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction,
1983 DUKE L.J. 987; see also Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 530, 536–37 (1989) [hereinafter Friedman, Revisionist Theory]; Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REV.
1301, 1304 (1978). Critics also point to the oftentimes years-long delays associated with
abstention. See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 54 (2d ed. 2011). Finally, some are skeptical that the Court has announced a
coherent and logically consistent basis for abstention. Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071,
1154 (1974) (noting that the reasoning for certain types of abstention is “not clear”).
33 See, e.g., Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 533; William A. Calhoun, II,
Arthur Miller’s Death of a Doctrine or Will the Federal Courts Abstain from Abstaining?
The Complex Litigation Recommendations’ Impact on the Abstention Doctrines, 1995
B.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 978 (1995); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 654–55 (1999).
34 See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 30, at 1053 n.10.
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haps only understood in the specific contexts in which the branches of the
doctrine arise.35 The Younger abstention doctrine, as stated above, generally
requires a federal court to decline jurisdiction in favor of parallel state enforcement proceedings if certain prerequisites are met.36
In Younger, the plaintiff was charged in state criminal proceedings with
violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.37 He brought a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin38 this prosecution, arguing that the state law at issue was
impermissibly vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.39 The federal three judge court sided in his favor, but the
Supreme Court reversed.40 Justice Black, writing for the majority, opined that
the lower court should have abstained from hearing the federal claims for multiple reasons.41
He began by alluding to the longstanding guideline that federal courts
should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings,42 though critics at
the time (and since) attacked this reasoning as historically flawed.43 His opinion then cited theories of both equity and comity or federalism to justify absten35

Id. For example, the abstention doctrine announced in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943), is predicated on a desire to defer where the claim asserted in federal court
potentially interferes with state efforts to regulate a complex area of law invoking local
concerns, which is administered by state tribunals with special competence, and there is no
overriding federal interest. Id. at 317–18; Chiropractic Am. v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99,
103–04 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871, 1881 (1999). Pullman abstention, in contrast, is intended to avoid
federal court interference in an important state program or statutory scheme based on an
ambiguous and potentially unconstitutional state law. Either the federal court will interpret
the statute in a way that requires it to undertake an otherwise needless constitutional inquiry,
or it will interpret it narrowly in a way that potentially interferes with the state regime at
issue. It is preferable to have a state court construe the law in the first instance. See, e.g.,
Field, supra note 32, at 1090.
36 See, e.g., Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The defining feature
of Younger abstention is that even though either a federal or a state court could adjudicate a
given claim, when there is an ongoing state proceeding in which the claim can be raised, and
when adjudicating the claim in federal court would interfere unduly with the ongoing state
proceeding, the claim is more appropriately adjudicated in state court.”).
37 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38–39 (1971).
38 Younger also was accompanied by a companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971), which extended the abstention holding to situations involving requests for declaratory relief. Justice Black noted in the decision that declaratory relief would entail the same
disruption of ongoing state proceedings as would an injunction, and thus the same noninterference principles applied. Id. at 72.
39 Younger, 401 U.S. at 39–40.
40 Id. at 40, 54.
41 Id. at 43–45. John Harris, the federal plaintiff, had the last laugh. His constitutional
claims prevailed at the state level. See In re Harris, 97 Cal. Rptr. 844, 846 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971).
42 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
43 See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979) (noting numerous instances where
federal courts enjoined future prosecutions based on invalid state statutes); Burton D.
Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
740 (1974) (arguing that pre-Younger federal courts routinely invalidated state criminal law
and enjoined prosecutions based on statutes that violated federal law).
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tion.44 The former relied on the technical principle that a court sitting in equity
should not exercise its jurisdiction to enjoin ongoing criminal proceedings
where there is an adequate remedy at law;45 the latter was based on the ephemeral notion that the parallel federal and state judicial systems function more
smoothly and effectively if incidents of interference and intrusion are minimized.46 This, of course, led to an academic debate over which of these theories was more fundamental to the decision,47 and whether either of them can
even be distinguished in any meaningful way.48
It makes no difference in the end. Regardless of whether the initial basis
for Younger abstention is attributed to equity, comity, federalism, or some combination thereof, the Court has long since rejected equitable principles as any
real limitation on the scope of the doctrine.49 Shortly after the Younger decision, the Court expanded its holding to require abstention in cases where there
was a parallel state civil enforcement lawsuit.50 It has since required abstention
44 Compare Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (one rationale “is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law”) with id. at 44 (a
more fundamental basis is “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways”). See generally Robert Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that “Interfere” with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 27, 33–34 (1976).
45 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
46 See id. at 44; Bator, supra note 27, at 620–22 (generally discussing comity).
47 Commentators focusing on the equitable basis concentrate on the last sentence of the
opinion, which states that “our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under
equitable principles to justify federal intervention.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 54; see also Jeremy D. Sosna, Comment, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Continuing Saga of
the Younger Doctrine, 82 IOWA L. REV. 275, 284 (1996). They dismiss the earlier passage
characterizing comity as “an even more vital consideration.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44;
accord Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 248–49, 281 (1988) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered] (conceding that comity was the basis for Younger “in large part”); see also Ann
Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the
Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1060 (1988) [hereinafter Althouse, Misguided Search].
48 Some commentators have “split the baby” in this regard, either by arguing that the
Court’s analysis essentially combined and commingled the notions of equity, comity, and
federalism, see Rehnquist, supra note 30, at 1066, or by asserting that “[i]n the context of
Younger abstention, the language of equity was used exclusively to serve the interests of
federalism,” Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate Foundations of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 311, 321 (1990) (emphasis added).
49 Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097,
1112–15 (1985) [hereinafter Wells, Wrong About Abstention] (discussing the erosion of the
equitable bases for Younger abstention); see also 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4254, at 236 n.3 (3d ed. 2007) (citing commentary on the
extension of Younger to civil litigation); Michael T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation
in Light of Younger, Pennzoil, and Colorado River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 208–11
(1989) (discussing the expansion of Younger abstention).
50 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604–05 (1975).

8

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

in cases involving state administrative proceedings51 and even state civil proceedings involving private parties where an important state interest was at
stake.52 Today, many of the state proceedings warranting Younger abstention
do not involve a court at law capable of awarding an adequate legal remedy to
address the equitable relief implicated by the federal claim; therefore, technical
equitable jurisdiction rules cannot be dispositive.53 The idea that contemporary
Younger abstention is based on anything other than abstract notions of comity
or federalism should be rejected.54
The expansion of Younger abstention does not mean that the doctrine is
limitless, however. The Supreme Court has devised a mechanical test to determine whether abstention is appropriate. In Middlesex County Ethics Committee
v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), the Court considered a
case involving an attorney who made inflammatory comments impugning the
competence and impartiality of a court overseeing a trial of his former client.55
The county ethics committee initiated an investigation and eventually filed a
bar complaint against him.56 The lawyer responded by commencing a federal
lawsuit asserting that the state bar disciplinary rules violated the First Amendment.57 The Court held that comity and federalism concerns underlying the
Younger doctrine mandated federal abstention, despite the fact that the state bar
proceedings were purely administrative.58 It formulated the now-familiar threeprong test for Younger abstention: First, is the parallel state matter that is the
purported basis for abstention an “ongoing state judicial proceeding”? Second,
does it implicate important state interests? And third, is there an adequate
opportunity in the proceeding for the party resisting abstention to raise his or
her federal claims?59
This Younger test has endured until the present, at least subject to certain
exceptions.60 Courts can abstain only if all three of the requirements are met,
but Younger abstention is mandatory under those circumstances, provided that
51

See, e.g., Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 424
(1982).
52 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
53 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (“[W]e have not treated
abstention as a ‘technical rule of equity procedure.’ ”).
54 Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55
TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1169–91 (1977) (discussing the demise of equity as a limitation of
Younger abstention); Wells, Wrong About Abstention, supra note 49, at 1113 (observing that
“[f]ederal-state comity has become the sole foundation for Younger abstention.” (emphasis
added)); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985)
(discussing the rejection of equity as the primary basis for Younger abstention); see also
Daniel C. Norris, Comment, The Final Frontier of Younger Abstention: The Judiciary’s
Abdication of the Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193,
198 (2003) (same conclusion).
55 See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 427–29
(1982).
56 Id. at 428.
57 Id. at 429.
58 Id. at 431–32, 437.
59 Id. at 432–37.
60 See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts 395–99 (2nd ed. 2003) (discussing exceptions); Daniel Jordan Simon, Comment, Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts
Have Opened the Door to the Eradication of “Our Federalism”, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1355,
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certain exceptions do not apply.61 This lack of discretion is problematic for two
interrelated reasons. First, as discussed below, the three Middlesex factors have
been expanded so broadly that most parallel state criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement or similar actions will satisfy them. It seems counterintuitive
to announce that a court should only abstain in extraordinary or narrow circumstances, and only if certain prerequisites are met, but then relax the requirements so that they provide no real limitation.
Second, these expansive standards are reasonably clear, and state defendants contemplating abstention are not stupid. These defendants know if there is
a pending state enforcement proceeding, and whether it provides an opportunity
to adjudicate a federal claim. At that point—where a party considering abstention knows whether its request is likely to be granted—Younger abstention
becomes less a narrow exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and
more an automatic right to a federal stay or dismissal.
This is not to say that Younger abstention is always granted and never
declined. Litigants test boundaries; they overestimate how closely their case
matches a typical Younger fact pattern; and judges misapply established law.
But the fact that the Middlesex factors are reasonably clear and broad, and
abstention is nondiscretionary, means that a successful Younger request is anything but extraordinary. The statistics seem to bear this out, with the reported
decisions selected by this Article’s methodology indicating that courts grant
Younger abstention requests roughly as often as they deny them.62
So a Younger abstention request is not a slam dunk, but neither is it a
desperation half-court shot. It is a request for relief that routinely is granted to
halt a federal lawsuit when it involves claims also implicated by an ongoing
parallel state judicial proceeding. And there is nothing wrong with that! A
broad procedural rule that funnels federal claims to pending state enforcement
proceedings, unless the claimant can prove that he or she will not get a fair and
unbiased hearing, may well be advisable, at least as a policy matter. But this is
no longer an extraordinary and narrow equitable exception to federal jurisdiction—it is more a broad jurisdictional mandate.
Therein lies the heart of the Younger debate. If the Court thinks that lower
federal courts should unilaterally decline to hear a significant class of cases
1360 (2005); Brian Stagner, Avoiding Abstention: The Younger Exceptions, 29 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 137, 138–40 (1998).
61 See, e.g., Colo. Riv. Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22
(1976); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639, 645 (2d Cir. 2009); Hartford Courant
Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Aaron R. Petty, Matters in
Abatement, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 137, 161 (2010) (discussing the nondiscretionary
nature of Younger abstention).
62 As discussed infra, of the 368 such decisions selected by this Article involving a definitive Younger ruling, the party seeking abstention was successful slightly more often than not
(51.6 percent of the time). Infra at Section III.C. This is roughly consistent with another
recent quantitative survey of Younger abstention requests, which observed a 44.8 percent
success rate in 29 published circuit court cases from 2000 to 2003. See Leonard Birdsong,
Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will
Always be with Us — Get Over It!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 410–18 (2003). The success
rate for non-Younger abstention requests is much lower. For example, in the cases catalogued by Professor Birdsong, non-Younger abstention requests were successful 22.5 percent
of the time. Id. at 418–19.
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where Congress has otherwise conveyed jurisdiction to them, there should be
an unimpeachable foundation for that decision. With respect to Younger
abstention, that fundamental basis is the implied belief that state tribunals are
presumptively competent to adjudicate federal claims unless proven otherwise.
This notion is the sine qua non of the doctrine, and it has been hotly disputed
by abstention critics.63 Yet despite the centrality of this assumption and the
controversy surrounding it, there has been surprisingly little effort by scholars
to examine what actually happens when a federal court abstains (or not).64 That
empirical inquiry is this Article’s focus. First, however, I should recount the
evolution of the Younger doctrine to emphasize how it has become less a rare
equitable exception to federal jurisdiction, and more a broad embodiment of the
assumption of state court adequacy.
B. The Expansion of the Middlesex Factors
1. Ongoing State Judicial Proceedings
The first Middlesex prerequisite—that the state matter which is the basis
for abstention be an “ongoing state judicial proceeding”—has been extended so
far that two of those four words are misleading. The first is judicial. The
Supreme Court expanded the scope of Younger abstention from state criminal
proceedings to certain civil matters within a few years of handing down its
seminal decision,65 but even earlier than that, it suggested that abstention might
be warranted where there is a pending administrative proceeding.66 The Court
dispelled all doubt in Middlesex itself, and a substantial number of Younger
cases today involve parallel state administrative proceedings.67 There is even
authority that an administrative investigation will suffice once it passes the
“initial stages,” though the Court is silent on the issue.68
The requirement that the parallel state proceedings be “ongoing” at the
time a federal lawsuit is filed is interpreted just as loosely. The Court long ago
rejected a strict rule that Younger abstention will be warranted only if state
63 It is important to note that almost all of the criticism of Younger abstention focuses on
this subsequent expansion of the doctrine, and not the narrow result in the case itself. The
original Younger decision was not controversial, as indicated by the Court’s 8 to 1 vote.
Indeed, a contrary holding would have led to the unworkable situation where criminal
defendants could routinely interrupt ongoing state prosecutions to affirmatively assert their
federal defenses in federal court. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1095 (6th ed. 2009).
64 Infra Section III.A (discussing relative lack of empirical work on Younger abstention).
65 See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335–36 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604
(1975).
66 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1973) (Younger abstention might be
appropriate where there are pending administrative proceedings).
67 See Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982)
(Younger abstention warranted where there were pending administrative proceedings). Subsequent federal decisions have been similarly clear. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v.
Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627–28 (1986); Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163–65 (10th Cir. 1999).
68 See Amanatullah, 187 F.3d at 1163–64; Crenshaw v. Supreme Court of Ind., 170 F.3d
725, 728 (7th Cir. 1999). But see Agriesti v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1002
(9th Cir. 1995) (classifying such investigations as “executive” and not “judicial”).
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proceedings are commenced prior to the federal lawsuit.69 Under the Court’s
current application of the doctrine, abstention is warranted no matter which
proceeding was filed first if the state matter was commenced prior to any hearings of substance on the merits in federal court.70
So if administrative and possibly even investigative proceedings are judicial, and matters commenced after the filing of the federal action can be ongoing, then what limitation does the first Middlesex factor impose? The Court
expressly addressed this question in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (NOPSI), when it declined to abstain
under Younger from hearing a preemption challenge by utilities companies to
the decision by local regulators to reject a proposed utilities rate increase,
which was also pending in a state appellate court.71 Justice Scalia held for the
majority that the denial of the rate increase request and the subsequent state
court review that followed the administrative decision may have been ongoing,
but they were not judicial.72 He distinguished between a court’s or administrative agency’s action to enforce or punish a violation of a rate order, and the
separate and distinct task of setting that rate.73 While the former is judicial no
matter who undertakes it (i.e., court or administrative tribunal), the latter is
“legislative” and falls outside the scope of Younger abstention.74
Thus, NOPSI stands for the proposition that the proceedings providing a
basis for Younger abstention must be primarily judicial and not legislative. This
is not intuitive. A state easily may have a stronger interest in holding legislative
administrative proceedings without interference than it does in conducting its
own unimpeded judicial administrative proceedings, and there is nothing inherent in the notions of comity or federalism dictating different results in the two
cases.75 Nor does NOPSI provide an easy formula to ascertain whether a proceeding is judicial or legislative.76 Nonetheless, where a state proceeding is
cited as the basis for abstention, courts will ask whether it “‘declares, and
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist,’” or whether it “‘looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some
69 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); see also Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149
F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing and applying Hicks).
70 Majors, 149 F.3d at 713. The Hicks rule means that a state can block previously-filed
federal litigation by commencing an action before any proceedings on the merits in the
federal case. This phenomenon has been called “reverse removal.” See Bryce M. Baird,
Comment, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 531 (1994); Norris, supra
note 54, at 201–02.
71 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 350
(1989).
72 See id. at 369–70.
73 Id. at 371–73.
74 Id. at 369–73.
75 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. REV. 953, 954
(1991) [hereinafter Althouse, State Court Resource]; Lee & Wilkins, supra note 32, at
355–56; Vairo, supra note 32, at 212.
76 Lee & Wilkins, supra note 32, at 355–56.
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part of those subject to its power.’”77 The former will be judicial and susceptible to abstention; the latter will be legislative and not.78
2. Important State Interest
The second Middlesex factor—that important state interests must be implicated by the parallel state proceedings—is the most amorphous of the Younger
requirements because almost any state interest can be compelling if formulated
broadly enough. For example, if the proceedings ultimately relate to the spheres
of criminal, education, family, property, public health, or corporate law, they
will involve an important state interest.79 Furthermore, NOPSI cautions that
courts should not narrowly inquire as to whether the particular state litigation
itself involves an important state interest—instead, they should look to whether
generic proceedings of that type, when viewed in the aggregate, implicate an
interest that is important to the state.80 If the interest is such that the exercise of
federal jurisdiction “would disregard the comity between the States and the
National Government,” that is enough.81 This expansion of the state interest
requirement to encompass such broad-based concerns understandably has been
criticized as virtually eliminating the second Middlesex requirement.82
The fact that this Younger prerequisite is so malleable has not rendered it
wholly ineffective, however. A common approach is to determine whether the
asserted state interest overlaps or impinges upon a clear federal one.83 If the
court concludes that the state interest lies in an area that is primarily federal in
nature, the second Middlesex factor will be unmet.84 The formulation, in effect,
77

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 370–71 (citing Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226–27
(1908)).
78 The rough rule is that courts generally view rule- or rate-making proceedings to be legislative, but administrative enforcement actions as judicial. See, e.g., Night Clubs, Inc. v. City
of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998); GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson,
111 F.3d 469, 481–82 (6th Cir. 1997). These fine distinctions are interesting but largely
irrelevant. While the first Middlesex requirement is the one most often successfully challenged—parties opposing abstention prevail on this issue 27.1 percent of the time (56.2
percent of all anti-abstention cases)—it is usually because there is no ongoing state proceeding that arguably might interfere with the federal lawsuit. Infra, at Section III.A.
79 See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 396 F.3d 348, 352–53 (4th Cir. 2005)
(cataloguing areas that have been important state interests).
80 Id. at 353–54. So, for example, the question of whether a particular airport shuttle service
is licensed or not may be relatively unimportant or trivial, but the state’s interest in regulating intrastate carriers will not be. See, e.g., Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of
Colo., No. 01-1025, 2001 WL 1355987, at *2, 5 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2001).
81 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1987).
82 Id. at 30 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring); Althouse, State Court Resource, supra note 75, at
997–98; Baird, supra note 70, at 540–41 (noting the shift in focus from the federal plaintiff’s
posture to the state’s interests, so perhaps any interest warrants abstention); Simon, supra
note 60, at 1375–79; Patrick J. Smith, Note, The Preemption Dimension of Abstention, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 310, 324 (1989). Parties successfully oppose abstention on these grounds
only 6.0 percent of the time (i.e., in 12.4 percent of anti-abstention decisions). Infra, Section
III.A.
83 See Simon, supra note 60, 1372 n.135 (cataloguing state decisions adopting this analysis); see also Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 47, at 1084–89 (advocating such an
approach in the aftermath of Pennzoil).
84 See, e.g., Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. McCarty, 270 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir.
2001); Ayers v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1188 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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equates an important state interest with an important interest that does not overlap with a federal one. This presents two problems. First, the Supreme Court’s
Younger analysis only requires an important state interest; it says nothing about
a countervailing federal concern. The fact that the former exists should satisfy
this Middlesex requirement on its face.85
Second, even if there were some merit to the artificial notion that a state
cannot have a Younger interest in an area that overlaps with a federal interest,
applying the second Middlesex factor in this way frequently puts the cart before
the horse. Current Younger cases often involve a preemption claim.86 Yet if a
state interest cannot exist when there is an overlapping federal concern, in order
to determine that the second Younger factor is met, a federal court effectively
would need to resolve the preemption claim in order to decide whether to
abstain from hearing it.87
3. An Adequate Opportunity to Raise the Federal Claim in an
Unbiased State Forum
The third Middlesex factor—that there must be an adequate opportunity in
the applicable state forum for the party opposing abstention to adjudicate his or
her federal claim—traces back to Younger itself. Justice Black’s opinion is
clear that deference to ongoing state proceedings will not apply if “‘it plainly
appears that [pursuing federal claims in state court] would not afford adequate
protection.’”88 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions are also unambiguous: “a
85

Take, for example, air ambulance licensing. On the one hand, regulating emergency medical services—by ensuring that ambulances are properly equipped, adequately stable, reliable, etc.—is a crucial part of the important state interest in protecting public health. See, e.g.,
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has
broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the
health of everyone there.”); Overman v. Occoquan, Woodbridge, Lorton Vol. Fire Dept.,
Inc., No. 90-2475,1991 WL 255849, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 1991) (Virginia municipal codes
emphasize the state interest in regulation of emergency vehicles). On the other hand, regulating interstate air transportation is an undeniable federal interest that statutorily preempts
most competing state regulation. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374, 379, 390–91 (1992); see also 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006) (expressly preempting all state
laws relating to air carrier “price, route or service”). This scenario has been addressed by two
courts recently. One ordered abstention and one did not. Compare Air Evac EMS, Inc. v.
Robinson, 486 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (declining to abstain), with Eagle
Air Med Corp. v. Colo. Bd. of Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (D. Colo. 2008)
(abstaining).
86 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S.
350, 364–67 (1989); see also Simon, supra note 60, at 1370–71 (discussing NOPSI’s treatment of preemption).
87 See Midwestern Gas, 270 F.3d at 539. Judge Posner held that because the interest implicated by the state proceedings (i.e., the regulation of the interstate natural gas market)
unquestionably lay in the federal sphere, no important state interest was at stake. However,
he recognized the tension between this logic and the NOPSI dictate that federal preemption
claims are well-suited for Younger abstention, and he limited his holding to cases involving
“defiance of clear federal law.” Id. at 539. It is important to emphasize, however, that a
Younger analysis comparing overlapping state and federal interests certainly might be an
improvement over the current toothless “state interest” requirement. See Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 47, at 1084–90.
88 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
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necessary [Younger] predicate . . . is, ‘the opportunity to raise and have timely
decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.’”89
There is some confusion as to whether this factor is separate and distinct
from a Younger exception, which precludes abstention when the state tribunal
is “incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it,”90
or whether it subsumes the exception. The Court has portrayed the issue both
ways.91 Commentators are similarly inconsistent,92 and several lower courts
specifically have noted the confusion on this issue.93 Yet regardless of whether
the third Middlesex factor is a two-part test requiring an adequate forum and a
lack of bias, or whether the presence of such a forum is the third requirement
and bias constitutes a separate but related exception, or even whether adequacy/
bias itself is a two-prong exception, the analysis is unchanged.94 In order to
abstain, a federal court must conclude that a claimant has an adequate opportunity to pursue his or her claim in an unbiased, competent state tribunal.
a. An Adequate Opportunity to Raise the Federal Claim
It should not be surprising, then, that the third Younger requirement effectively takes the form of a two-part test. First, there must be an actual opportunity for the federal claimant to raise his or her claim. The Supreme Court first
addressed this principal in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which
Florida inmates brought a class action challenging their pretrial detention without a probable cause hearing. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted
that the pending state proceedings—the criminal trials—necessarily would
occur too late to address the alleged constitutional violation resulting from pretrial detention.95 Thus, the claimants had no opportunity to pursue their claims
at the state level, and abstention was inappropriate.96
Commentators observe that this scenario in which a federal claimant is
actually precluded from asserting his or her claim is perhaps the best example
89

Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
577) (1973).
90 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577–80; accord Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 n.4 (1975)
(existence of biased tribunal is one of the extraordinary circumstances alluded to in Younger
where abstention is inappropriate even though all of the Younger elements have ostensibly
been met); see also Althouse, State Court Resource, supra note 75, at 999–1001 (bias is an
exception).
91 Compare Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577–80 (analyzing bias as part of the “adequate forum”
inquiry), with Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125 n.4 (analyzing bias as a separate exception).
92 See, e.g., Althouse, State Court Resource, supra note 75, at 999–1001; Sosna, supra note
47, at 277 n.9; Stagner, supra note 60, at 137.
93 See, e.g., Trust & Inv. Advisors, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing confusion); Yamaha Motor. Corp. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 797 n.10 (8th Cir. 1994)
(same); Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116, 125 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990), aff’d on reh’g, 914 F.2d 1349, vacated in part
on other grounds, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.1991).
94 See Stagner, supra note 60, at 172.
95 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
96 Id.; see also Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 553 n.109 (discussing the
requirement for an opportunity to litigate the federal claim as set forth in Gerstein).
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of a procedurally inadequate state forum.97 Yet it is not easy for a party opposing Younger abstention to prevail on these grounds. For example, many administrative proceedings are limited in what defenses or counterclaims may be
raised, but this generally is not an impediment to abstention. If the federal
claimant can raise his or her claim in a judicial appeal or review of the administrative hearing (as is usually possible98), then this is enough to satisfy the third
Middlesex requirement.99 That is true even if judicial review is discretionary.100 Nor is there a mechanism for a federal claimant to preserve his or her
claim for subsequent federal review in a Younger abstention case.101 Regardless of whether the claim is actually brought at the state level, it cannot be
heard later in federal court.102
The fact that federal claimants opposing Younger abstention have the burden to prove that state procedural laws bar the presentation of their claims at all
points during the litigation makes matters even more difficult for these litigants.103 In other words, the adequacy of state tribunals to adjudicate the
asserted federal claims is the baseline presumption for courts considering the
issue.104 The existence of dispositive—and unfavorable—state authorities on
the substantive issue also will be irrelevant. There is no requirement for the
federal plaintiff to have a real chance of success at the state level, only that he
97

See Michael G. Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention
into Ongoing State Proceedings, 66 N.C. L. REV. 49, 68 (1987) (“The best example of a
purely procedural inadequacy occurs when the state system forbids raising the federal issue
that requires a prompt decision in an ongoing state court lawsuit.”).
98 See Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1053–56 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (noting that state administrative decisions are usually subject to judicial review).
99 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986);
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 425 (1982) (a
federal court should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs had an opportunity to present their
federal claims in the state proceedings); see also Rehnquist, supra note 30, at 1110; Eric
Turner, Comment, You Say Remedial, I Say Coercive, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Why
the Remedial/Coercive Distinction Is Not Critical in Younger Abstention, 49 WASHBURN
L.J. 629, 640 (2010). This is true even if it is ambiguous whether the federal claimant could
even raise his or her claim at all—writing for the majority in Dayton Christian, Justice
Rehnquist noted that in that scenario, the federal claimant should put his or her federal
defense before the state tribunal and allow it to construe its own statutory mandate in light of
the Constitution. See Dayton Christian, 477 U.S. at 629 (“But even if Ohio law is such that
the Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates,
it would seem an unusual doctrine, and one not supported by the cited case, to say that the
Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles.”).
100 See Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 747–48 (6th Cir. 1996); Hirsh v. Justices of
Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995).
101 See, e.g., Los Altos El Granada Inv. v. City of Capitola, 583 F.3d 674, 680 (9th Cir.
2009) (discussing the inapplicability of an England reservation of rights in a Younger case);
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 77 F.3d 1178, 1184 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 608–10 (1975) (implying the same).
102 See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977); Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116,
123–24 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Baird, supra note 70, at 538–39.
103 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427
(1979).
104 Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15; 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1279 (11th Cir.
2003).

16

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

or she has a legitimate opportunity to assert his or her claim.105 In the end, the
only thing rendering the third Younger factor unmet will be if the federal claimant shows that he or she is actually precluded from asserting the claims at the
state level.106
It may be hard to believe that federal claimants ever prevail on this issue,
but they do.107 One common scenario in which a state tribunal will be inadequate is when the federal claimant is not a party to the related state proceedings, and it is unlikely the court will resolve his or her claim.108 Another
situation where abstention will be inappropriate is when the federal claim
invokes exclusive federal jurisdiction and cannot be heard at the state level.109
b. Bias
The second part of the adequate opportunity/no-bias Younger requirement
precludes abstention where the state tribunal is impermissibly biased against
the federal claimant. The Court first invoked this restriction in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), when it refused to abstain from hearing a Civil
Rights Act lawsuit involving federal claims that were also implicated by parallel administrative proceedings before the Alabama State Board of Optometry.
Justice White concluded for the majority that the tribunal consisting of a separate group of licensed optometrists had a distinct pecuniary and competitive
interest in seeing the claimants’ licenses revoked.110 As a result, he opined that
this rendered the tribunal impermissibly biased, and thus the Younger prerequisite requiring an “opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent
state tribunal the federal issues involved” was not met.111
A party opposing abstention will not easily prevail on this argument. It is
true, on the one hand, that bias is the only abstention exception (if properly
viewed as such) that the Court has successfully invoked.112 But perhaps fearing
that this exception was inviting decades of litigation over whether particular
105

See, e.g., Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Administracion De Terrenos De Puerto Rico, 889 F.2d
1181, 1183 (1st Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has noted that “courts . . . sometimes change
their minds.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 n.18 (1975).
106 Moore, 442 U.S. at 430–31; Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court of Cal., Cnty. of L.A.,
23 F.3d 218, 224 (9th Cir. 1994).
107 Younger abstention is declined because this factor is not met 15.5 percent of the time, or
in 32.0 percent of anti-abstention decisions. Infra, Section III.A.
108 See, e.g., Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1992); Bunting ex rel. Gray v.
Gray, No. 99–1752, 2001 WL 69347, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2001); N.J. Sports Prod., Inc. v.
Don King Prod., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542–43 (D.N.J. 1998).
109 See, e.g., Kan. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assoc., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1071
(8th Cir. 1996); S.W. Shattuck Chem. Co. v. City & Cnty of Denver, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1235,
1237 (D. Colo. 1998).
110 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973). The state optometry board essentially attempted to revoke the licenses of all optometrists employed by business corporations,
which would have greatly benefited the “private practice” optometrists adjudicating the matter. Id.
111 Id. at 577. This analysis indicates that the bias analysis is part of the third Middlesex
factor, though as noted above, other Court decisions portray it as a Younger exception. See
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 n.4 (1975) (biased tribunal is one of the “extraordinary
circumstances” alluded to in Younger where abstention is inappropriate even though all of
the Younger elements have ostensibly been met).
112 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577–80; see also Stagner, supra note 60, at 165.
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state tribunals were impermissibly biased, federal courts have since limited the
doctrine so that it is far from helpful in opposing abstention.113
First, mere allegations of bias are insufficient. Federal courts will not
lightly conclude that a state court is anything but fair and impartial,114 and a
litigant asserting “bias must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity
in those serving as adjudicators.”115 A party arguing that he or she lacks an
adequate opportunity to litigate a federal claim due to bias therefore must allege
concrete and specific facts indicating that the state tribunal at issue is improperly biased116—for example, that it has a financial interest in the matter,117 or
that it has already prejudged the claim.118 And even this will not end the
inquiry. If the party opposing abstention alleges bias on the part of a single
judge or member of an administrative tribunal, he or she generally must have
attempted to seek recusal, or showed that there was no procedural mechanism
to do so.119 Litigants occasionally assert that recusal is impractical because the
bias is institutional or structural.120 Courts are especially critical of such arguments, which require substantial factual support and rarely succeed.121
113 See, e.g., Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125 n.4 (bias is one of Younger’s “extraordinary circumstances” alluded to by Younger); United Books, Inc. v. Conte, 739 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir.
1984) (“[The bias exception] to Younger’s policy of abstention ha[s] been very narrowly
construed by the [Supreme] Court.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 13.4, at 753–54 (2d ed. 1994) (noting the substantial difficulties of showing that a Younger
state forum is biased); Stagner, supra note 60, at 174. Younger abstention is successfully
opposed for bias only 0.8 percent of the time (or in 1.7 percent of anti-abstention decisions).
Infra, Section III.A.
114 See, e.g., Althouse, State Court Resource, supra note 75, at 1001 (quoting Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1 (1987)); see also Danner v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Tenn.
Supreme Court, No. 07-5647, 2008 WL 1987043, at *4 (6th Cir. May 6, 2008) (“While bias
is an exception to Younger abstention, it is an extraordinary one, and the petitioner alleging
such must offer ‘actual evidence to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators’ ” (quoting Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2005))).
115 Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir. 1997).
116 See, e.g., Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577–79; Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 640
(1st Cir. 1996); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registr. in Med. of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 776 (1st Cir.
1990).
117 See Yamaha Motor. Corp. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1994).
118 Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992).
119 See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125–29 (1975); Brooks, 80 F.3d at 640. Additionally, even where a state forum presents significant questions of bias, some courts require a
further showing that this bias constitutes “irreparable harm” to the party opposing abstention.
See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577). For example, if a federal claimant can pursue an interlocutory appeal
of the purportedly biased decision through an impartial judicial review process, the exception will not apply. Id.; Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramı́rez, 364 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir.
2004).
120 See, e.g., Cobb v. Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 334 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57–58 (D.
Mass. 2004) (describing the general assertion); Brooks, 80 F.3d at 640 (same); Stagner,
supra note 60, at 171.
121 See, e.g., Brooks, 80 F.3d at 640 n.9 (characterizing structural bias claims as “weak”
generally); see also Danner v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Tenn. Supreme Court, No. 075647, 2008 WL 1987043, at *4 (6th Cir. May 6, 2008).
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PARITY DEBATE

A. Criticisms of the Fundamental Assumption of State Court Adequacy
Commentators generally agree that this last adequacy requirement lies at
the heart of the entire Younger doctrine. The first two Middlesex factors are
largely formalistic; they define the practical circumstances under which abstention may be possible.122 The third prong, in contrast, is the essential safeguard
that explains why a federal court is even permitted to decline jurisdiction in
favor of a parallel state forum at all.123 This distinction between the procedural
requirements of the Younger doctrine and the fundamental basis behind it is
perhaps the reason that the Supreme Court has characterized the adequacy of
the state tribunal as “the only pertinent inquiry” in the analysis.124 It is also
why commentators observe that state forum adequacy is the fundamental
assumption underlying the doctrine.125 This importance is underscored by the
various Younger exceptions, which mostly address scenarios in which there is a
concern that a timely, competent, and unbiased resolution might be
jeopardized.126
In other words, if federal claims cannot systematically be decided fairly
and competently by state tribunals, there can be (or should be) no Younger
doctrine.127 Perhaps for that reason, this aspect of Younger abstention has
122 See Mounkes v. Conklin, 922 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (D. Kan. 1996) (“The first two
requirements address whether Younger principles . . . are present.”).
123 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 248–49 (“It is precisely
because state courts can be trusted to uphold federal interests that it is unnecessary for federal courts to intervene and enjoin allegedly unconstitutional proceedings.”); Collins, supra
note 97, at 51–52; Comm. on Fed. Courts of the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, The Abstention
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, in 122
F.R.D. 89, 106–07 (1988) [hereinafter Abstention Doctrine]; Friedman, Revisionist Theory,
supra note 32, at 540 (presumed state court adequacy is a “key ingredient” of Younger
abstention).
124 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); see also Weinberg, supra note 27, at 1214
(state forum adequacy is the “underpinning” of Younger). This primacy is reflected in
Younger itself, which is expressly premised on the notion that there can be no irreparable
injury to a federal claimant as a result of abstention if his or her claim can be resolved in a
fair and timely manner by a state tribunal. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36, 47–48
(1971).
125 See, e.g., Althouse, State Court Resource, supra note 75, at 957–58 (noting that many
Supreme Court doctrines, including Younger abstention, are predicated on the assumption of
parity); Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 244–49 (noting that Younger
abstention is based on an assumption of parity); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18 (1977) [hereinafter Neuborne, Myth of Parity] (“However, by
uncritically assuming parity, the Supreme Court has avoided the difficult, but critical, issue
of whether concerns for federalism, efficiency, and caseload outweigh the importance of
having constitutional claims heard by the more sympathetic and competent forum.”).
126 See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 60, at 523 (characterizing Younger exceptions as part of a
“process model” designed to ensure an adequate state forum); Althouse, State Court
Resource, supra note 75, at 999–1004 (discussing rationale for Younger exceptions).
127 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 626 (noting that the state court will be allowed to
adjudicate only if there was, or will be, a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the constitutional question in the state court); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV.
283, 319–20 (1988) [hereinafter Wells, Disparity] (emphasizing that Younger is premised on
the notion that there is an adequate state forum to hear the federal claim, and that abstention
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drawn extensive scholarly criticism.128 Commentators frequently reject the
notion—implicitly or explicitly—that it is possible, at least in many circumstances, for state forums to provide a sufficiently adequate and unbiased opportunity to litigate a federal claim.129
Several point out, for example, the fundamental tension between the second and third Younger requirements.130 They observe that if a particular state
proceeding invokes an important state interest, it is unrealistic to expect a state
tribunal to disregard that interest and provide an adequate opportunity to litigate a federal claim where doing so negatively impacts the state’s interest.131
Especially in these sorts of situations, the state forum seems likely to give federal claims short shrift.132
Professor Ann Althouse, while arguing that there was not an important
state interest at stake in Pennzoil, even has suggested (perhaps tongue-incheek) that such “unimportant” cases logically are the type best suited for
Younger abstention, because they present the smallest concern that the state
tribunal will be influenced by the implicated state interest.133 Professor Barry
Friedman provides a more earnest view on this issue: “Where the state’s interest in the outcome of the dispute is very high, however, so is the potential for
state court bias against the federal claimant, because a finding of merit in the
federal claimant’s constitutional claim often will defeat the state prosecution or
enforcement effort.”134
Not all Younger commentators are as nuanced in their criticism of the
adequacy of state tribunals. Many simply reject the underlying presumption
that state courts are a fair and unbiased place to adjudicate federal claims. It is
not that these commentators think that there is a tension between the second
and third Middlesex factors, or (for example) that making a litigant argue a
federal claim as a defense in a criminal or quasi-criminal state matter puts him
or her at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a federal civil plaintiff,135 or that abstention
cases otherwise present some sort of special difficulty for federal claimants at
the state level. These critics just have pervasive doubts that state courts generwill be inappropriate if not); see also Moore, 442 U.S. at 430 (suggesting that the comity
concerns underlying the Younger doctrine would be outweighed if state courts were not
competent to adjudicate federal claims).
128 See Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 537–39 & n.36 (cataloguing criticisms based on the notion that state courts cannot adequately protect federal rights).
129 Id. at 537 n.36; see also Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 483 (1978) [hereinafter Redish,
Younger v. Harris] (“Harsh reality may justify doubts about the competence of state courts
in enforcing federal rights.”).
130 See, e.g., Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 47, at 1083–84; Friedman, Revisionist
Theory, supra note 32, at 542–43.
131 Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 542–43.
132 Id.
133 See Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 47, at 1083–84.
134 See Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 542–43.
135 Though, of course, some commentators do make this argument. See Douglas Laycock,
Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP.
CT. REV. 193 (1977); Chemerinsky, Parity Revisited, supra note 47, at 255.
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ally protect federal rights as well as their federal counterparts.136 They oppose
Younger abstention, at least in part, because they believe that it rests on a
flawed assumption of state forum adequacy.137
Some Younger sympathizers belittle this view as nothing more than naked
forum-shopping.138 They assert that regardless of how Younger critics dress
their objections, what they really want is to have federal claims heard in a
perceived sympathetic forum.139 This characterization is unfair, of course.
Younger critics identify a number of conceptual and legal flaws in the doctrine
unrelated to the concern that state tribunals are inadequate to protect federal
rights. Professor Martin Redish, for example, has argued at length that Younger
abstention amounts to the improper judicial veto of the Article III jurisdiction
conveyed by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.140 He and other commentators also assert that Younger abstention lacks a logically coherent foundation,141 and that several of the proffered
basis for the doctrine conflict with one another.142
Pro-Younger commentators often dismiss these well-taken legal arguments with a wave of the hand. So what, they ask? They assert that in the
absence of any policy arguments as to why abstaining in favor of parallel state
proceedings is a bad thing, these are unpersuasive technical objections.143 And
because the systematic state forum inadequacy is the only imaginable reason
136

See, e.g., Neuborne, Myth of Parity, supra note 125, at 1117–18 (arguing that doctrines
like Younger abstention that assume state court parity are flawed); Redish, Younger v. Harris, supra note 129, at 483 (“Harsh reality may justify doubts about the competence of state
courts in enforcing federal rights.”); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court
“Federal” Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 897 (1985)
[hereinafter Redish, Supreme Court Review] (calling assumption of adequacy underlying
Younger abstention “inaccurate”); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 686
(1987) (Younger abstention routinely results in denial of constitutional rights).
137 Friedman succinctly summarizes this position in his 1989 article, A Revisionist Theory of
Abstention, in which he states:
Implicit in every criticism of abstention is the assumption that, absent a federal forum, federal
rights will not be vindicated. Abstention’s critics are of the view that state courts are not as
sensitive to claims of federal rights as are federal courts. Thus, denial of a federal forum runs the
risk of effectively denying the plaintiff a federal right.

Supra note 32, at 537–38 (footnotes omitted).
138 See, e.g., id. at 530; Wells, Disparity, supra note 127, at 298 (critics of doctrines such as
Younger abstention largely base their opposition on the “gap between federal and state
courts in their treatment of federal claims”); see also Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford
Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1986) (“Those who believe that federal courts are particularly
qualified to protect constitutional claims view abstention as threatening that protection.”).
139 See Davies, supra note 138, at 2–3.
140 See Redish, Limits of the Judicial Function, supra note 32 at 71.
141 See Redish, Younger v. Harris, supra note 129, at 465.
142 See Redish, Supreme Court Review, supra note 136, at 897.
143 See Redish, Limits of the Judicial Function, supra note 32 at 77 (suggesting that the
separation-of-powers argument against abstention is a red herring); see also Friedman, Revisionist Theory, supra note 32, at 537 (“Missing from this summary of the debate, of course,
is any explanation of why abstention’s critics believe it matters if a plaintiff is denied a
federal forum.”).

Fall 2011]

YOUNGER ABSTENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

21

that would undercut Younger proponents’ favorable views of abstention, those
supporters assume that this is the true basis of critics’ objections.144
Trying to determine what Younger critics (or supporters, for that matter)
really believe is a fool’s errand. It is also unnecessary. Regardless of whether
they are exclusively, or primarily, or merely substantially, motivated by a belief
that federal courts treat federal claims more generously, the fact remains that
many do actually cite state forum inadequacy as a prominent argument against
abstention.145 Younger proponents unfairly disparage this as simple forumshopping, and they certainly are too quick to dismiss rule-based objections to
the doctrine as unpersuasive unless accompanied by policy arguments. But
these Younger supporters are justified in offering a legitimate response to the
also-legitimate objection of Younger critics that the doctrine fundamentally is
based on the incorrect premise that state courts systematically provide an adequate forum to resolve federal claims. This has always been central to the
debate. There is nothing wrong in treating it as such.
B. The Broader Parity Debate
Nor is the issue an esoteric discussion of an obscure jurisdictional quirk.
The debate over the fundamental Younger assumption that state tribunals can
competently and fairly adjudicate federal claims was a substantial part of the
larger, decades-long argument about federal and state court “parity” that
reached a crescendo from the late 1970s until the late 1980s.146 This broader
conversation centered on the question of whether state courts generally can be
trusted to adjudicate federal constitutional and statutory rights as well as federal
courts, or whether they are indifferent or hostile to such claims.147 The academic controversy saw such leading federal courts scholars as Professor Redish, on the one hand, argue at length that state courts are both technically less
competent than their federal counterparts and more biased against federal
144 The general belief that opponents are arguing in bad faith runs both ways. See Barry
Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and
State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1221 (2004) [hereinafter Friedman, Allocating
Cases] (discussing the claim that views on parity “merely disguise the expression of nakedly
ideological preferences”). For example, there is a sense that some Younger critics believe
that their opponents are motivated more by a desire to see the expansion of federal constitutional rights halted by hostile state courts, than they are by notions of comity or federalism.
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 254 (discarding this view as
unproductive).
145 See supra note 136.
146 Infra, Section II.C.
147 There is significant debate even over the definition of the term parity. See Susan N.
Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651, 651–53 (1989) (discussing the various
definitions). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, defines it as “whether, overall, state
courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect federal constitutional rights.” Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 233 n.1. Professor
Michael Solimine, on the other hand, defines it as “the concept that state judges are presumed at some level to be as willing and capable of giving claims of federal rights a fair
hearing as would federal judges.” Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2005) [hereinafter Solimine, Future of Parity] (internal quotation marks omitted). The description I use here roughly combines the two.
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claims.148 The opposing side featured, at least at the outset, the late and inestimable Professor Paul Bator, who argued that state court detractors mischaracterize many of the forum’s purported weaknesses and ignore a number of
its advantages.149
Professor Burt Neuborne’s The Myth of Parity is widely credited with
sparking the debate.150 He opened his discussion of contemporary institutional
considerations on the issue with the following observation:
The Supreme Court, however, presently seems bent on resolving forum allocation decisions by assuming that no factors exist which render federal district courts
more effective than state trial or appellate courts for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights. I hope to challenge the Court’s present assumptions, and to support
my own, by focusing on institutional characteristics relevant to assessing the relative
competence of state and federal courts as constitutional enforcement mechanisms.
. . . . [B]y uncritically assuming parity, the Supreme Court has avoided the
difficult, but critical, issue of whether concerns for federalism, efficiency, and
caseload outweigh the importance of having constitutional claims heard by the more
sympathetic and competent forum.151

Interest in the topic began to wane by the early 1990s, when most of the
parity arguments had been made and participants were mainly speaking past
one another. The fact that the federal bench was becoming increasingly dominated by Republican appointees and thus (purportedly) was increasingly hostile
to constitutional rights did not encourage continued discourse.152 This sentiment is perhaps captured best by Professor Chemerinsky in a 1991 article:
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court legitimately feared that state courts
would frustrate federal decisions protecting civil rights and civil liberties. . . . With
conservative Reagan and Bush nominees dominating the federal bench, it is unrealistic to assume that federal courts are more likely than state courts to protect constitutional liberties.153

There was modest agreement between the various participants by that
time. The general—though not universal—consensus was that there was a
“weak parity” between the state and federal courts.154 State courts are not fun148 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 230 (1985); Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and
Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333–36 (1988) [hereinafter Redish, Judicial
Parity] (arguing that federal courts are superior at enforcing constitutional rights); see also
Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 233–36 (discussing the debate).
149 See generally Bator, supra note 27; Solimine, Future of Parity, supra note 147, at
1457–61 & nn. 2–3 (discussing Bator’s article).
150 Timothy L. Gartin, Parity and the Litigation of Private Property Rights in the United
States and Germany: Evidence in Support of Chemerinsky’s Litigant Choice Principle, 15 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 747, 750 (1995).
151 Neuborne, Myth of Parity, supra note 125, at 1117–18 (footnote omitted).
152 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1991)
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate]; Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The
Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 797–99 (1995) [hereinafter Neuborne, Parity Revisited].
153 Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 152, 593–94.
154 See, e.g., Neuborne, Parity Revisited, supra note 152, at 797 (acknowledging that he
initially envisioned a “weak” parity); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline
of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 610–11
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gible with federal courts in that they provide identical results in a given case, or
that they side for or against federal claimants an equal percentage of the time as
their federal counterparts.155 But at the same time, state courts do rule in the
favor of such claimants at a respectable though perhaps numerically inferior
clip, and they certainly seem to give federal claimants a bona fide opportunity
to present their claims.156
To be sure, commentators on both sides of the issue strenuously disagree
as to whether this is enough. Proponents of the notion that there is sufficient
parity view a real but comparatively lesser chance of success as sufficient to
conclude that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims,157 while
opponents of the proposition believe that a situation where federal courts are
more responsive to federal claims is, by definition, the antithesis of state court
adequacy.158 Yet this is more an unresolvable philosophical debate than anything else.
And both sides have their drawbacks. With respect to those who believe
that weak parity is sufficient to support the fundamental assumption of state
court adequacy, they often fail to identify the inevitable point at which a legitimate but numerically inferior chance of success in state court becomes just too
small. Perhaps there is adequate parity if (for example) the federal claimant is
two-thirds as likely to prevail in state court as in federal court. But what about
half as likely? A third? A tenth? A hundredth? The claimant eventually will
face such a numerically arduous road in state court that whatever weak parity
exists cannot support the notion that state courts systematically provide an adequate forum to adjudicate federal claims.159
Those who argue that weak parity is insufficient to support the federal
doctrines that assume state court adequacy, on the other hand, tend to ignore
litigation realities. Perhaps federal claimants face a somewhat more hostile
reception in state court—but is the difference any more attenuated than the one
between certain federal courts? And at the risk of perpetuating stereotypes,
would it be advisable to have constitutional claims systematically transferred to
(1991) [hereinafter Wells, Parity Debate] (arguing that there is general consensus that weak
parity exists); Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 152, at 602–03 (conceding that a “milder” form of parity exists, but calling the conclusion incomplete); see also
Herman, supra note 147, at 654–55 (noting that Court jurisprudence seems to accept weak
parity).
155 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 147, at 652 (explaining “strong” and “weak” parity);
Wells, Parity Debate, supra note 154, at 610. But see Solimine, Future of Parity, supra note
147, at 1469.
156 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 58–59 (1999) [hereinafter SOLIMINE & WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS] (distinguishing between “weak” and “strong” parity).
157 See id. at 58; see also Wells, Disparity, supra note 127, at 313.
158 See, e.g., Redish, Supreme Court Review, supra note 136, at 897.
159 Professor Herman alludes to this in her Why Parity Matters, supra note 147, at 652. She
correctly observes that merely concluding that weak parity exists is not enough to justify
federal doctrines that assume parity (such as Younger)—instead, at that point, “a range of
views exists on the issue of how much federal and state courts must differ before the factor
of parity should affect jurisdictional decisions.” Id. In other words, the dispositive question
is not whether there is strong or weak parity. The question that we should be asking is, given
that there appears to be some degree of parity, precisely how weak or strong is it?
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the Ninth Circuit from the Fourth or Fifth Circuits if, for example, the latter two
were statistically less likely to side with such claimants? At some point, even
the most adamant federal court proponent must accept that some courts—even
fair, impartial, and competent courts—can intrinsically or subconsciously favor
or disfavor some classes of claims.160 A procedural rule channeling all federal
claims to the most sympathetic forum would be both unrealistic and hopelessly
unfair to defendants resisting such claims.161
In any event, the debate over parity has not faded away entirely. Law
review articles discussing the topic pop up more-or-less regularly,162 and litigators in the business of asserting novel constitutional claims often chime in to
compare their experiences with these new legal theories in state and federal
courts.163 From the early 1970s to the present, there have been tens of
thousands of pages of articles and books dedicated to this debate. I do not
attempt to relitigate any of it.
C. The Centrality of Younger in the Parity Debate, and the Increasing
Role of Empirical Analysis
Nevertheless, there are two important points to emphasize about the overarching question of parity: first, Younger abstention was central to the conversation; and second, empirical analysis emerged as a contested but important
way to examine the issue. As for the first of these points, it is crucial to note
that the Younger doctrine was not just some tangentially-related side issue that
parity scholars occasionally referenced. To the contrary, the Younger doctrine
has been cited as one of perhaps two164 primary examples of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that fundamentally rely on an assumption of parity.165 The parity
debate was, in large part, a debate over the propriety and wisdom of Younger
abstention—and vice versa.
160 This raises a separate objection. State courts may be relatively hostile to some claims,
but some is not all. Would abstention be proper in the remainder of cases?
161 See Bator, supra note 27, at 631–35. Professor Bator rejected the notion that any forum
automatically favoring federal claimants is superior to one that does not. He argued that
constitutional claims are often counterbalanced by other constitutional structural principles,
including the separation of powers, and that state courts may well be superior at protecting
and enforcing them. Presumably, a rule systematically funneling cases to a forum disfavoring such constitutional principles would be unfair to the state defendants who have a vested
interest in interpreting and enforcing their own laws.
162 See generally Friedman, Allocating Cases, supra note 144; Solimine, Future of Parity,
supra note 147.
163 Gay rights litigation is perhaps the most prominent example of this. In the past decade or
so there have been several books and articles suggesting that there is a sense of “reverse
parity” at play with respect to these sorts of claims—in other words, state tribunals are
actually more protective of gay rights than are their federal counterparts. See, e.g., DANIEL
R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (2003); William B. Rubenstein, The
Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT, 599, 623 (1999).
164 The other involves how federal courts should resolve Fourth Amendment habeas claims
first brought at the state level. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 529 (1976).
165 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645,
646–47 (1991) (Younger abstention is “where the parity debate in the courts has been fought
in recent years.”).
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For example, the above quotation from Professor Neuborne’s Myth of Parity includes two footnotes citing examples of the Court’s “uncritical” assumption of parity. The first lists four cases, including Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), in which the Court first applied Younger abstention principles
to state civil enforcement proceedings.166 The second is even more explicit. As
support for his proposition that the Court has “avoided” weighing federalism
and other concerns against the interest in having a sympathetic and competent
forum, Neuborne specifically discusses the expansion of the Younger doctrine
to that point.167 Based on this observation, he clearly saw Younger abstention
as one of the principal developments—if not the principle development—in
Court jurisprudence driving his discussion.
Younger sympathizers were no less sanguine about the implications of the
parity debate. Professor Bator, for example, in his article entitled The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, highlighted Younger abstention
as one of several doctrines designed to “smooth over” federal-state friction by
channeling federal claims to state court if—but only if—they would get a full
and fair hearing.168 In their important but controversial 1983 article, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, Professors Michael Solimine and James Walker similarly listed
Younger abstention first among their examples of jurisprudence that highlights
the parity debate.169 They characterized the doctrine as a “primary focus for the
critics of parity.”170
This pattern of Younger abstention assuming a central role as the practical
manifestation of the parity debate continued in earnest throughout the 1980s
and into the 1990s. Professor Chemerinsky echoed the sentiment in his Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, in which he called
Younger expansion “[o]ne of the most important legacies of the Burger
Court.”171 He argued that Younger abstention directly implicated and rejected
notions of state court inferiority, and he went on to characterize parity as “a
central concern in the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional decisions.”172 A vocal
proponent of federal-state parity, Professor Michael Wells, similarly has called
the Younger decision the “primary vehicle” for restricting federal court access
under notions of parity.173 In sum, the Younger doctrine was more than just an
outcropping of the larger parity debate; it largely was the debate.174
166

See Neuborne, Myth of Parity, supra note 125, at 1117 n.47.
Id. at 1118 n.48.
168 See Bator, supra note 27, at 621–22.
169 See Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation, supra note 26, at 216.
170 Id. at 218.
171 Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 248–49.
172 Id. at 249, 253.
173 See Michael Wells, Disparity, supra note 127, at 313.
174 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 147, at 662 (discussing the ramifications of the parity
debate on Younger abstention, and characterizing it as one of the main practical contexts in
which parity arises); see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 128–29 (1989)
[hereinafter Solimine & Walker, State Court Protection] (abstention is normally justified or
attacked based on arguments over parity).
167

26

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

The second important thing to note about the parity debate is the emergence of empiricism as an analytical tool used to examine the issue. In his 1977
article, Neuborne observed that he “know[s] of no empirical studies that prove
(or undermine) [the assumption]” that federal courts are more sympathetic to
federal claims.175 Indeed, in an accompanying footnote he elaborates: “No
comparative study of the relative performance of state and federal courts in the
enforcement of constitutional rights appears to exist.”176 Perhaps scholars took
this as a challenge,177 or perhaps it is coincidence, but Neuborne’s remarks
soon were proven outdated.
Solimine and Walker unveiled their unprecedented comparative analysis
of federal and state adjudication of constitutional claims in a 1983 article.178
They aggregated over one thousand state appellate and federal trial court decisions involving First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, coded each
case according to a number of variables, and then crunched the numbers.179
The authors reached several interesting conclusions. First and foremost, they
found that the studied claims were successful in federal court 41 percent of the
time, and in state court 32 percent of the time.180 This discrepancy was statistically significant, though Solimine and Walker argued that it was not meaningful.181 They further broke down their results by types of claims and found that
there was not even a statistically significant difference in state and federal
courts’ treatment of some claims.182
The study attracted substantial criticism, with Chemerinsky taking the lead
role. He argued that by focusing only on court decisions, the authors ignored
cases that might settle or not even be filed due to perceived judicial hostility.183
He theorized that the state court decisions examined by Solimine and Walker
would be self-selected to be the most meritorious constitutional claims because
litigants would have abandoned them otherwise—and vice versa for federal
cases and less meritorious claims.184 The results thus would skew toward federal claimants in state court and against them in federal court, suggesting a
misleadingly small discrepancy.185
Chemerinsky also objected to the study because it conflated civil and
criminal cases and challenges to state and federal statutes.186 He argued that
differences in the likelihood that a state or federal legislature would enact an
unconstitutional statute, as well as differences in how courts treat a constitu175

Neuborne, Myth of Parity, supra note 125, at 1116.
Id. at n.46.
177 See Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and
Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 249–51 (1999) (attributing subsequent empirical parity studies to
Neuborne’s observation).
178 Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation, supra note 26, at 213.
179 Id. at 232–46.
180 Id. at 240.
181 Id. at 241.
182 Id. at 242–46.
183 Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 262.
184 Id. at 262–63.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 263–64.
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tional claim versus a constitutional defense, would substantially skew the
results.187 Another of his many criticisms was that the study compared federal
trial courts with state appellate courts, which (he concluded) is a flawed applesto-oranges comparison.188 In the end, Chemerinsky fundamentally rejected that
parity could ever be empirically measured.189
The general criticism of empirical analysis has been echoed by a number
of scholars on both sides of the parity debate. Bator, for his part, essentially
viewed the anti-parity arguments as non-empirical in nature.190 Professor Redish doubted that the issue of parity could ever benefit much from empirical
analysis,191 which was a view that has been shared by more recent commentators.192 And specifically with respect to Solimine and Walker’s study, scholars
who were dubious about the existence of parity in the first place were nearly as
critical as Chemerinsky about their purported empirical demonstration of it.193
Solimine and Walker’s study has even drawn criticism from otherwise sympathetic commentators for its purported use of “rudimentary” statistical
methods.194
Yet despite these misgivings, the empiricists have persisted as an important voice in the parity debate. A smattering of empirical studies comparing
state and federal court outcomes popped up in the aftermath of Solimine and
Walker’s article.195 Not all of them reached the same conclusion as Solimine
and Walker did. Professor Thomas Marvell conducted a survey in 1984 of
attorneys who had been involved in student rights litigation in state or federal
court.196 He reported that the lawyers generally viewed federal courts as more
receptive to students’ constitutional claims, and that attorneys asserting such
claims chose federal court far more frequently than their opponents.197
Solimine followed up on his 1983 article with a similarly-purposed empirical study in 1991 in which he compared the treatment of section 1983 claims
in state and federal courts during 1987.198 This piece was not nearly as compre187

Id. at 264.
Id. at 267.
189 Id. at 262. Solimine and Walker responded to these methodological criticisms in a 1989
article. See Solimine & Walker, State Court Protection, supra note 174, at 141–42.
190 See Bator, supra note 27, at 623. Though it should be pointed out that Professor Bator
made this observation prior to Solimine and Walker’s study.
191 See generally Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 148 (broadly agreeing with Chemerinsky that parity cannot be empirically proven).
192 See Friedman, Allocating Cases, supra note 144, at 1221 n.25 (cataloguing authorities
doubting that parity can be empirically demonstrated).
193 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 147, at 658 n.29; Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for
Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984
WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1337–39 (1984); Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 148, at 332 (agreeing with Chemerinsky’s criticisms of the Solimine and Walker study).
194 See PINELLO, supra note 163, at 107.
195 See Gerry, supra note 177, at 253–57 (generally discussing the actions of state courts
when deciding constitutional claims).
196 See Marvell, supra note 193, at 1343–52.
197 Id. at 1371–72. Professor Marvell found that at least half of the lawyers representing
students chose federal court, whereas only one-seventh of the lawyers representing schools
did the same.
198 See Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV.
383, 415 (1991) [hereinafter Solimine, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction].
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hensive as his prior effort, and he only included 114 state and 20 federal opinions in his analysis.199 Nonetheless, Solimine’s conclusion echoed his previous
finding that there was little meaningful difference in how often the federal
claimant prevailed.200
A few more recent commentators attempted the sort of comparative analysis first employed by Solimine and Walker, though there has been surprisingly
little work on the topic.201 In 1999, Brett C. Gerry, then a clerk for Judge
Silberman on the D.C. Circuit (and subsequently Justice Kennedy on the
Supreme Court) and now apparently an Assistant Attorney General with the
Department of Justice, undertook a study to empirically explore how state
courts were reacting to the significant Supreme Court decision in Nollan v.
Calif. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nollan fundamentally altered the
scrutiny applied in takings cases, but it also left a number of unanswered questions about the deference to be afforded to governments exercising their eminent domain powers and how narrowly or broadly the decision should be
construed.202 Gerry examined how state or federal courts were answering these
outstanding issues and concluded that there generally was no difference in their
treatment, regardless of the forum.203 In 2003, Professor Daniel Pinello published a book empirically examining the treatment of gay rights claimants over
two decades.204 He found that state tribunals sided with the federal claimants
much more often than did federal courts (47.2 percent to 30.2 percent).205
III. THE SURVEY
A. Existing Empirical or Quantitative Studies Focusing on Abstention (and
Lack Thereof)
The last two points bear repeating. First, the Younger doctrine was central
to the broader conversation about parity, and second, empirical analysis became
a controversial but important analytical tool to address that overarching issue.
Given these facts, one might suspect that there is at least a modest commentary
199

Id. at 415–18.
Id. at 419.
201 See PINELLO, supra note 163, at 106–08 (observing that only the Solimine and Walker,
Solimine, and Gerry studies involve a comparative aspect); Gerry, supra note 177, at 251
(discussing paucity of empirical literature). Far more common have been studies focusing on
how state courts resolve claims under state or federal laws without comparing that to federal
courts’ performance. For example, in 1988, Professor Craig Bradley published an empirical
study examining how state courts were applying and enforcing Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary Study, 77 GEO. L. J.
251 (1988). In a particularly broad 1992 study, Professors Craig Emmert and Carol Ann
Traut examined nearly 3,000 state court decisions involving the facial constitutionality of
state statutes. They observed that the statute in question was ruled unconstitutional 5.4 percent of the time on federal grounds, 9.0 percent of the time on state grounds, and 4.5 percent
of the time on both grounds. See Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme
Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 42 (1992).
202 See Gerry, supra note 177, at 260–64.
203 Id. at 284–85.
204 See PINELLO, supra note 163, at 116.
205 Id. at 111.
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applying an empirical approach to Younger cases to explore the parity question
directly in the abstention context.
That logical suspicion would be wrong. There has not been a single study
to date comparing how federal courts and state tribunals resolve the federal
claims raised in Younger cases after the initial federal court either decides to
abstain and effectively remands the matter to a state forum, or declines to
abstain and keeps the case.206 In fact, the entire academic Younger field is
largely devoid of any empirical or even basic quantitative analysis that might
help academics and practitioners understand when and why courts are
abstaining, and what happens after abstention.
The only works to even tangentially approach Younger abstention from an
empirical perspective are a 1982 article by Professor Theodore Eisenberg,207 a
1988 student note by David Mason in which he expanded on Professor Eisenberg’s data,208 the 2003 article by Professor Birdsong,209 and a 1988 study
conducted by the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar
Association.210
Eisenberg’s piece presented the results of an empirical analysis of section
1983 claims resolved in unpublished decisions by a single federal district court
from 1975–1976.211 He included a brief discussion of the results of abstention
arguments in such cases, but he does not distinguish between different types of
abstention, and his anecdotal discussion of various cases implies that the vast
majority involved Pullman abstention.212 It thus is difficult to draw any empirical conclusions about Younger abstention from Eisenberg’s work.
Mason’s note, which used the raw data from Eisenberg’s 1982 article as
well as two more of Eisenberg’s studies not involving abstention,213 actually
focused on the Younger doctrine, but it nonetheless suffers from the same
206 This lack of interest in what happens after Younger abstention is not limited to the
empirical context. As noted above, the federal plaintiff in the Younger case itself successfully pursued his federal constitutional claims in state court after abstention—yet very few
commentators (and virtually none of the canonical ones) acknowledge it. But see WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 49, § 4251 at n.22 (noting that Harris was ultimately successful in state
court). One possible explanation for the disinterest, suggested by Professor Solimine in correspondence, is that scholars generally view the issue of Younger abstention as settled. This
is for good reason—the Supreme Court has shown little inclination to revisit the doctrine in
the two decades since NOPSI, its last major Younger decision.
207 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982).
208 See generally David Mason, Note, Slogan or Substance? Understanding “Our Federalism” and Younger Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 852 (1988).
209 See generally Birdsong, supra note 62.
210 See generally Abstention Doctrine, supra note 123.
211 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 207.
212 Id. at 539–43. This should not be surprising, given that Eisenberg was looking at a
period predating Younger expansion.
213 Specifically, Mason used the data from Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642–43 (1987), and
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 719, 720 (1988). These studies also looked at the performance of a few federal district
courts over a small period (typically less than two years), but they did not focus on
abstention.
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flaws. First, Mason also commingles the data involving various types of abstention, thus rendering it unhelpful for a Younger-specific analysis.214 Second, all
of the data comes from time periods during 1975–1976 or 1980–1981, which
largely predate the expansion of the Younger doctrine.215 Nonetheless, this was
a laudable step towards the goal of at least trying to determine how often
Younger abstention is pled and granted.
Birdsong’s purpose was less ambitious. He merely catalogued Younger
abstention circuit court decisions from 2000 to 2003 and concluded that in
those 29 cases the appellate courts ultimately abstained 44.8 percent of the
time.216 Birdsong then discussed a number of these Younger cases in detail but
made no effort to determine why, statistically speaking, courts decided to
abstain under Younger (or not), or how the underlying federal claims were
resolved after an abstention determination.217
The last attempt to empirically examine the Younger doctrine, the New
York State Bar report from 1988, held the most potential to reach the question
that is this Article’s focus. The Committee on Federal Courts sent an extensive
questionnaire out to certain practitioners inquiring about their experience with
abstention.218 A subsequent article by Professor Georgene Vairo, chairperson
of the drafting subcommittee, disclosed that 39 such questionnaires were sent to
counsel-of-record in Younger abstention decisions handed down by the Second
Circuit since 1971, and that approximately half of the attorneys responded.219 It
specifically asked participants whether and how the federal claim asserted in
the federal lawsuit was resolved by a state court after abstention220—obviously
the type of information that is relevant to the question of whether state tribunals
systematically provide a fair and adequate forum to resolve federal claims as
assumed by the Younger doctrine. However, the committee report did not provide these survey results.221
It is difficult to understand why there has been so little interest in analyzing Younger abstention from an empirical or quantitative perspective. Counting
cases is not hard, after all. For example, as previously noted, in the 368
214 See Mason, supra note 208, at 858. My suspicion is that this is because Eisenberg did
not distinguish between the various types of abstention when he collected the data—and
since this was not his focus, why should he? Regardless, Mason argues that the “distortion”
is insignificant, but this cannot be true. As noted above, Younger abstention appears to be
granted far more routinely than other types of abstention, supra note 62, and Eisenberg’s
1982 data suggests that at least in the mid-1970s Pullman abstention was invoked far more
frequently, supra note 207, so aggregating the various types of abstention requests almost
certainly would substantially skew the results.
215 This is more excusable, given that Mason was writing in 1988. Mason, supra note 208,
at 858.
216 This roughly corresponds to the results described herein, which found a 51.6 percent
success rate in 368 reported circuit and district court opinions. Infra, Section III.C (Tables A
and B).
217 Birdsong, supra note 62, at 411–18. This is not to suggest that Birdsong should be
faulted for the omission. It was not his focus.
218 See Vairo, supra note 32, at 189 n.122.
219 Id.
220 Abstention Doctrine, supra note 123, at 108–09.
221 I contacted Professor Vairo to inquire as to whether she had access to this data. Her
response was very generous and gracious, but unfortunately she could not locate the results.
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reported decisions (235 trial and 133 appellate) from 1995 to 2006 identified by
this Article’s methodology in which there was a definitive abstention ruling,
parties seeking Younger abstention prevailed 51.6 percent of the time and lost
48.4 percent of the time.222 And when a court declined to abstain, it was
because: (1) the first Middlesex factor was not met 56.2 percent of the time
(27.1 percent of all Younger cases); (2) the second Middlesex factor was not
met 12.4 percent of the time (6.0 percent of all Younger cases); (3) the third
Middlesex factor was not met 32.0 percent of the time (15.5 percent of all
Younger cases); and (4) an exception applied 16.9 percent of the time (8.2
percent of all Younger cases).223
It is tedious but not particularly difficult to gather this primitive data. But
it surely must be informative and helpful for practitioners and abstention commentators alike—yet except for the partial exceptions discussed above, no one
seems to have ever attempted to compile it. Why not? The absence of any
numerical sense of how often Younger abstention is granted and why it is most
frequently declined only heightens the importance and influence of conventional wisdom. And this wisdom, after all, may not be correct.224
And this says nothing of perhaps the most interesting question implicated
by Younger abstention: If the doctrine is premised on the assumption that state
forums can systematically provide an adequate and unbiased opportunity to
resolve federal claims, what actually happens in the relevant state proceedings
after abstention? And how does that compare with what happens in federal
court after an anti-abstention ruling? This Article attempts to fill in the gap in
the literature and answer those queries. It presents below the results of a survey
comparing the disposition of federal claims asserted in state tribunals and federal courts after Younger litigation from 1995 to 2006.
B. Purpose, Methodology, Typology, and Problems
1. Purpose of the Survey
My primary intent in undertaking this survey was to conduct an observational or descriptive study only, with all of the limitations that this type of
survey implies.225 The goal was to try to answer the straightforward questions
posed immediately above. I was (and am) not trying to examine what specific
factors or variables affect the resolution of federal claims in the abstention context, and I especially am not arguing that the post-abstention forum has any sort
222 The specific breakdown of success rates in federal district and appellate courts were 47.7
percent and 58.6 percent, respectively. Infra, at Section III.C.
223 Anti-abstention decisions frequently cite multiple Younger requirements as not being
met or exceptions as applying, which is why the summed percentages are greater than 100
percent.
224 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 122 (2009).
225 In such studies, variation among variables is observed but not manipulated. Thus, there
is always a significant risk that an observed correlation should be attributed to a third unmeasured variable. See ROGER BAKEMAN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SCIENCE STATISTICS: A
SPREADSHEET APPROACH 57–58 (1992). Observational or descriptive studies therefore are
best used to formulate hypotheses that can then be tested through more rigorous quantitative
analysis. Id.
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of predictive value with respect to this resolution. Nor do I contend that the
survey results are evidence for either side in the parity debate—to the contrary,
as explained below, I substantially doubt that this is the case.226
It is also important to note that my search parameters were intended to
capture the majority of reported Younger abstention decisions in a given year,
but they were not meant to be exhaustive. There are a number of additional
West abstention headnotes that were not searched, and I did not conduct text
searches in the cases themselves to identify unreported decisions. My goal was
only to find a representative sample of reported Younger abstention decisions,
not the entire universe of them. That task is worthwhile and an ultimate
research goal, but it remains for another day.
Finally, I should caution that my data analysis is highly simplistic at this
point. I did not perform the sort of sophisticated multivariate analysis that has
become the hallmark of the “ELS” movement, but instead merely tested for
statistical significance and correlation. Professors Solimine and Walker were
criticized for their “rudimentary” statistical methods;227 that criticism certainly
applies here.
2. Methodology
The survey encompasses a twelve year period from 1995 to 2006. This
was arbitrary—I initially intended to look at the decade from 1996 to 2005 but
added an additional year at each end to gather more data. I stopped then
because it was becoming increasingly difficult to determine the outcome of
state tribunal proceedings in the earlier years due to the unavailability of state
court and administrative decisions, and for the later years, final state decisions
were extending into 2010.228 I selected potential abstention decisions through
Westlaw searches of three West abstention headnotes: “Nature and grounds in
general” (170Bk41 k), “Constitutional and federal questions, abstention”
(170Bk46 k), and “Particular Cases and Subjects, Abstention – In General”
(170Bk47.1 k).229 I restricted the searches to headnotes to focus on decisions in
226

See infra Section IV.B.
See PINELLO, supra note 163, at 107.
228 State litigation process can take years to run its course after abstention. See, e.g., JMM
Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The JMM case involved
efforts by the Washington D.C. Office of Zoning to close an adult video store. Id. at
1119–20. The store filed a lawsuit in 2002 to halt the zoning proceedings, but Younger
litigation delayed matters until 2004 and it was not actually closed until September 2007. Id.;
see Moira E. McLaughlin, Zoning Board Told to Close Video Store, WASH. POST (Sept. 27,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2007/09/26/AR2007092600
770.html.
229 These were three of the four most populated abstention headnotes. Using a search for
[Younger & (1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006)] and
looking at the raw number of hits (which include multiple repeated and overlapping entries),
the first of these (170Bk41 k) has by far the most entries at 591—nearly twice as many as
the second (170Bk46 k, with 316), which I also used. The third most populous abstention
headnote was the “Particular Cases and Subjects, Abstention – Injunctions in General”
(170Bk54 k) headnote, with 245 entries. I chose the fourth most populous headnote
(170Bk47.1 k, with 191 entries) instead, due to concerns that the “Injunctions” headnote
would skew in favor of pro-abstention decisions.
227
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which Younger abstention featured prominently (thus warranting such a
headnote).230
I typically went year-by-year, working backward. I searched for the terms
“Younger” and the relevant year for all federal trial and appellate cases in all
three headnote categories.231 Based on an informal review of a few random
years,232 these search parameters seem to have located the vast majority of the
reported decisions, though there are a sizeable number of unreported decisions
not included in my analysis.
Once the sample of Younger decisions for the particular year being studied
was selected, I reviewed them on a case-by-case basis. Twenty-eight decisions
did not reach a definitive abstention result and were discarded. This included
instances where the court decided not to rule for or against the abstention
request,233 or where it mostly decided that another form of abstention applied
(or did not) but observed in an aside that Younger abstention might be appropriate (or was not).234 Several variables determined how the remaining 368
decisions were classified.
First, I assigned each decision to the pro- or anti-abstention, and trial or
appellate categories. Then, I sorted each decision based on whether the resolution of the federal claim after abstention proceedings was clear (i.e., whether it
was identifiably accepted, denied, or not decided). If I could identify what happened after the abstention decision, it was then classified based on whether the
claim was actually decided. Finally, I classified “decided” decisions based on
whether the federal claim was successful.
This last classification was the most difficult, or at least time-consuming.
The ultimate disposition of a federal claim in federal court after an anti-absten230 This generally meant that my searches only identified published opinions included in the
Federal Supplement (223 decisions), the Federal Rules Decisions (6 decisions), West’s
Bankruptcy Reporter (7 decisions), and the Federal Reporter (116 decisions), and unpublished but reported opinions included in the Federal Appendix reporter (16 decisions), all of
which are assigned headnotes by West Publishing. (No Supreme Court decisions were identified by my methodology.). It also appears that West began assigning headnotes to a few
unpublished and unreported federal district court decisions from isolated districts starting
around 2002, and seven such trial decisions were identified by my search methodology. In
order to maintain some degree of uniformity in my sample, however, I chose from the outset
to exclude this handful of unpublished and unreported trial decisions.
231 For example, [Younger & 2000] for the year 2000. The first headnote search generally
provided the vast majority of the unique decisions used in the survey. The other two headnotes overlapped substantially, but they usually identified an additional 10 percent or so
each. To pick a few years at random, in 2001 the first headnote uncovered 38 of the decisions, the second headnote did not identify any additional ones, and the third headnote identified five. In 2000, the first headnote encompassed 22 of the decisions, the second headnote
identified an additional three, and the third headnote again uncovered five.
232 Specifically, I searched for [Younger w/3 abstention] from 1999 to 2001 in all reported
circuit and district court decisions. I then skimmed the resulting cases to see if the court
reached a definitive abstention holding. My three headnote searches appear to have picked
up the lion’s share of the reported decisions that did so.
233 See, e.g., Sica v. Connecticut, 331 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D. Conn. 2004) (referring case
back to the magistrate for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the bad faith exception
applied).
234 See, e.g., Johnson v. Schnelz, 385 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(abstaining under Rooker-Feldman but noting that Younger might also apply).
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tion decision, for the most part, was not difficult to figure out. That result frequently was identified in the decision itself, or in a subsequent summary
judgment motion or an appeal. It was clear whether and how a federal claim
was resolved for 79.2 percent of the anti-abstention decisions.235
State tribunals are another story entirely. It was much harder to determine
what happened in these proceedings after a post-abstention decision. My goal
was to employ a consistent and standardized research approach as much as
possible. First, a handful of the decisions themselves reported the result of bythen-completed state judicial proceedings.236 For the rest I reviewed the
Westlaw case history for subsequent appellate or related federal court proceedings. Appeals of district court abstention decisions sometimes disclosed how
the state proceedings unfolded after the trial court effectively remanded the
case to state court;237 subsequent related district court decisions occasionally
did the same.238 If the federal case history was not helpful, I searched for state
decisions in the applicable state case databases. This search typically included
party names, case numbers (if known), and unique keywords from the federal
opinion that might help locate a parallel state court decision.239 It identified the
majority of state decisions included in the survey.
If those steps were unsuccessful, and the matter was an administrative
proceeding, I would go to the applicable state agency website to see if it maintained a database of decisions.240 Finally, where none of these steps helped
locate a state result, I used a commercial online search engine to look for party
names and other relevant key words. This sometimes located news reports concerning the case. Most often it reported a settlement, but sometimes the account
235 I suspect that most of the remaining anti-abstention cases settled after the abstention
litigation, but this hypothesis requires more research to confirm. There was an unexplainable
(and statistically significant) discrepancy between trial and appellate decisions—I could
determine what happened in 83.7 percent of the former, but only 69.1 percent of the latter.
236 See, e.g., Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519–21 (5th Cir. 2004) (abstaining
in favor of completed state proceedings challenging the contested subpoenas); Bess v.
Spitzer, 459 F. Supp. 2d 191, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). This was the case for nine of the 53
(17.0 percent) pro-abstention cases with an identifiable federal claim disposition. There were
two additional cases in which the state proceedings concluded after briefing but prior to the
abstention decision, and the federal court seems unaware of the result.
237 See, e.g., Dorsett Felicelli, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clinton, 349 F. Supp. 2d 355 (N.D.N.Y.
2004) (abstaining from deciding a § 1983 claim in favor of pending state proceedings); Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clinton, 305 Fed. Appx. 685, 686–87 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting
that the state proceedings were resolved solely on procedural grounds without deciding the
federal claim).
238 See, e.g., Levich v. Liberty Cent. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342–44 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (abstaining in favor of ongoing administrative proceedings); Levich v. Liberty Cent.
Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the administrative
proceedings had rejected the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims).
239 To the extent that multiple state decisions addressed the federal claim, I classified the
claim based on the last, final judgment in the case. See, e.g., Colonial First Prop., LLC v.
Henrico Cnty., Va., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1091 (E.D. Va. 2001) (abstaining from hearing a
constitutional challenge to an anti-nudity ordinance); Boyd v. Cnty. of Henrico, 581 S.E.2d
863, 870–71 (Va. App. 2003) (invalidating ordinance on constitutional grounds); Boyd v.
Cnty. of Henrico, 592 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing decision en banc).
240 This was especially helpful with respect to state bar proceedings, which frequently are
available online. See Bendel, Case No. 00-O-13391-RAH, at 14–17.
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disclosed a state decision that was not otherwise included in any searchable
legal database. If all of these search methods were unsuccessful, I classified the
decision as “unclear.”
3. Typology
The classification of a number of decisions required a judgment call. First,
the most controversial, and the one that caused the most hesitation: each federal
abstention decision constitutes a unique data point in the overall results. This
means, for example, that if a trial court granted abstention in a decision
included by the search methodology, and that result was upheld in a reported
appeal also included in the survey, those decisions were each included in the
aggregate survey results. Thus, if the subsequent state proceedings resolved the
federal claim, the post-abstention outcome was “double counted” in the final
overall tally.
This classification may seem questionable, and I wavered over the issue,
but I chose the approach for two reasons. The first is that this classification
seems the most consistent with the purpose behind my survey—I was looking
at what happened to federal claims after each Younger abstention decision. In
other words, my intent was to see what happens whenever a federal court determines that parallel state proceedings are an adequate forum to adjudicate an
asserted claim. This necessarily implies a decision-by-decision focus; the fact
that two such decisions correspond to the same underlying post-abstention outcome does not change the answer to the ultimate question and (I argue) should
not affect how each decision is evaluated on a stand-alone basis.
The second reason to use each federal decision as a unique data point in
the final aggregate tally is more practical. Given the various permutations of
trial and appellate court decisions in a given case, simply counting each decision as a separate and unique occurrence was the most straightforward way to
classify the data.241 And in any event, the number of double counted data
points is small: there were four pro-abstention decisions appearing twice in the
“federal claim rejected” category.242 If counted as single events, they would
increase the success rate for federal claimants in a state tribunal from 15.1
percent to 16.3 percent. Similarly, there were two double counted anti-absten241 Consider, for example, an anti-abstention decision that is reversed on appeal. Under my
methodology, the classification is simple—the trial court decision is a “no abstention” one,
with the post-abstention resolution of the federal claim classified however it was decided
prior to reversal (or “not decided” if it was not resolved prior to then). The appellate decision, if included, is a separate and distinct pro-abstention decision, with the disposition of the
federal claim classified however it is resolved afterward at the state level. It is unclear how
an approach that evaluates unique cases rather than decisions would treat this scenario.
242 See, e.g., Lui v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishment of Del., 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir.
2004); Lui v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishment of Del., 213 F.R.D. 166 (D. Del.
2003); Colonial First Prop., LLC v. Henrico Cnty. Va., 236 F. Supp. 2d 588 (E.D. Va. 2002);
Colonial First Prop., LLC v. Henrico Cnty. Va., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (E.D. Va. 2001);
Carroll v. City of Mt. Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 1998); Carroll v. City of Mt. Clemens, 945 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Commc’ns Telesys. Intl. v. Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Commc’ns Telesys. Intl. v. Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1999).
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tion decisions in the “federal claim accepted” category.243 Counting each singularly would decrease the success rate for federal claimants in post-abstention
federal proceedings from 43.6 percent to 42.1 percent. (There were no doublecounted cases in any other “decided” categories.) Finally, to avoid any confusion, separate results for trial and appellate abstention decisions are presented
with the aggregate results wherever possible.
The rest of the classification rules are more straightforward. In a few cases
involving multiple federal claims, some prevailed and some did not. For these,
I tried to determine whether the relief fundamentally sought by the federal
claim, or opposed with a federal defense, was substantially granted.244 For
example, if a judge or lawyer opposed disbarment or removal from the bench
on multiple federal grounds and was partially successful, the decision’s classification depended on whether he or she was ultimately disbarred or removed as a
result of an unsuccessful federal defense.245
Trying to determine whether a federal claim was actually raised and adjudicated also required a judgment call at times. Some of the more arguable ones
are as follows: A federal claim was classified as “decided” if it was affirmatively raised in the post-abstention proceedings but was rejected without elaboration.246 A federal claim was classified as “not decided” if the post-abstention
court or tribunal ruled against the claimant on purely procedural grounds or
other substantive grounds,247 even if the claim was clearly raised.248 A federal
243 See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004); Hartford
Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D. Conn. 2003); Winnebago Tribe of Neb.
v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kan. 2002).
244 See Cooper v. Parrish, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1211 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (raising “litany” of
constitutional complaints related to Tennessee nude dancing ordinance); State ex rel. Gibbons v. Jackson, 16 S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting some constitutional
claims but ultimately refusing to enforce statute solely on First Amendment grounds); Carroll, 945 F. Supp. at 1075 (abstaining from adjudicating damages claim under Takings
Clause and Fair Housing Act in connection with town zoning action); Carroll, 139 F.3d at
1075 (same as to FHA claim); City of Mt. Clemens v. Carroll, No. 219085, 2001 WL
738484, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun 29, 2001) (rejecting all federal damages claims but
upholding prior state court injunction of enforcement of zoning code on rational basis
grounds). I included Cooper in the “federal claim accepted” category, and the Carroll decisions in the “federal claim rejected” category.
245 See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir.
2003) (abstaining in favor of pending judicial misconduct proceedings); In re Thomas J.
Spargo, N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct (March 29, 2006), available at http://
www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/S/spargo.htm (ruling against judge on some but not all
ethics charges and removing him); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 803
N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (App. Div. 2005) (rejecting First Amendment ethics defenses).
246 See Jou v. Chang, 350 F. Supp. 2d 862, 871 (D. Haw. 2004); Jou v. Chang, 155 P.3d 690
(Haw. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s constitutional challenges as meritless without
discussion).
247 See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1999) (abstaining
from considering § 1983 claims); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Richard’s Honda Yamaha, 38
S.W.3d 356, 363 (Ark. 2001) (deciding case solely on state grounds); see also Wis. Mfrs. &
Commerce v. Wis. Elections Bd., 978 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (abstaining
from First Amendment claim concerning Wisconsin political advertising regulatory proceedings); Elections Bd. of Wis. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 731–35 (Wis.
1999) (declining to rule on First Amendment claim and instead invalidating the challenged
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claim was classified as “unclear” even where there were identifiable postabstention proceedings if it was not clear whether it was affirmatively raised, or
if the decision resolving the post-abstention proceedings was ambiguous as to
whether it was addressing the claim.249 If a case settled or an abstention decision was overturned250 after an initial decision or interlocutory appeal (temporarily) resolved the claim, the abstention decision was classified based on that
resolution. If the case settled or the abstention decision was reversed prior to
such a resolution, the claim was classified as “not decided.”251
4. Methodological Problems
The foregoing methodology should implicate several concerns. First, the
survey only considers reported decisions, and it excludes a sizeable number of
unreported decisions involving Younger abstention. To the extent that ignoring
these unreported decisions causes my data to skew towards or against the party
requesting abstention—and there certainly is a plausible argument that a proabstention decision will be more likely to be published than an anti-abstention
one252—then that bias will be reflected. The flip side is that this reflected bias
proceedings as impermissible retroactive rulemaking). I initially classified the WMC decision as “accepted,” but on closer inspection I determined that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was not endorsing the First Amendment claim asserted in the federal lawsuit. To the contrary, it expressly declined to reach that result because the regulation at issue constituted
impermissible retroactive rulemaking. Id. at 736.
248 See, e.g., Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof’l Licensing, Dep’t of Commerce of
Utah, 240 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (abstaining from hearing federal claim); Weitzel v.
Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 20000516-CA, 2001 WL 312394, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Feb 1,
2001) (refusing to address licensee’s constitutional claims for procedural reasons). I also
wavered on Weitzel because the plaintiff was so insistent on raising his federal claims. I
ultimately classified the decision as “not decided” because the Utah courts were equally
steadfast in refusing to consider them.
249 See, e.g., Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 1998) (unclear whether federal
claims were raised in administrative proceedings and whether state lawsuit raising claims
was ever resolved).
250 Most post-abstention proceedings did not reach final decision before the abstention ruling was reversed. Only two decisions seem to fall in this category. See Harper v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of W. Va., 291 F. Supp. 2d 443, 462 (S.D. W. Va. 2003), rev’d at 396 F.3d 348
(abstaining from a Commerce Clause claim in favor of administrative proceedings that ultimately rejected that claim); O’Neill v. Coughlan, 436 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909 (N.D. Ohio
2006), rev’d at 511 F.3d 638 (declining to abstain from resolving a successful First Amendment claim).
251 See, e.g., Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 140–41 (1st Cir. 2008)
(reversing abstention decision due to bias); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cotto, 389 F.3d 212,
213 (1st Cir. 2004) (abstaining); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cotto, 327 F. Supp. 2d 110, 129
(D.P.R. 2004) (abstaining).
252 My intuition is that federal judges generally view pro-abstention decisions as more significant than anti-abstention decisions. Thus, when selecting decisions for publication, courts
could err on the side of publishing the former and not the latter. Indeed, there is a substantial
political science literature addressing decisions by judges to publish (or not) a particular
opinion. See generally Karen Swenson, Federal District Judges and the Decision to Publish,
25 JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325 (2001).
It suggests that opinions involving novel or complex legal issues tend to be published, and
since a successful Younger movant must satisfy a complicated multipart test, pro-abstention
decisions should be more likely to be published than anti-abstention ones. Yet this is incon-
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would only affect the abstention/no abstention ratio, and not the underlying
success rate of federal claims. In any event, my plan for the future is to conduct
a more exhaustive study including these unreported decisions.
Second, my methodology failed to identify the resolution of the federal
claim after abstention in 40.0 percent of the pro-abstention decisions. This pool
of “hidden” federal claim outcomes is troubling because insofar as they skew
one way or another, they will have a substantial impact on the survey results.253
They are analogous to classical nonresponders in social science surveys, and as
that literature notes, sample bias is a significant concern whenever nonresponse
rates exceed fifteen percent or so.254
There are a few steps that can minimize this risk, however. The first,
which I have done, is to scrutinize the nonresponder population to evaluate its
potential to skew the data.255 Of the “unclear” pro-abstention decisions, 17 of
76 (22.4 percent) identified by my survey involved a situation where there was
an identifiable post-abstention proceeding, but it was ambiguous whether the
federal claim was raised or resolved. The claimant lost in all of these, albeit for
those ambiguous reasons, so the decisions should not skew in favor of such
claims. Ten of the remaining “unclear” pro-abstention decisions (13.1 percent)
involved cases in which any post-abstention proceedings could not be identified, but the ultimate outcome was inconsistent with a successful federal claim,
usually because whatever action the claimant was challenging eventually
occurred.256 That leaves 49 “unclear” decisions—64.5 percent, or 25.8 percent
sistent with the limited results observed in my survey. In the sixteen unpublished decisions
reported in the Federal Appendix reporter identified by my methodology, the court elected to
abstain eleven times (68.8 percent). This is somewhat more than the 57.2 percent (67 of 117)
abstention rate observed in published appellate decisions, though the small sample size
means that the difference is not statistically significant.
253 My concern is that because state trial court decisions are rarely available, I am missing a
wide swath of state decisions ruling in favor of federal claimants. Criminal cases come to
mind. These trial court decisions would be unlikely to be appealed if they ruled in favor of a
defendant asserting a federal defense, so they would not be reported in any sources used in
this study. However, only a handful of the “unclear” decisions involve parallel state criminal
proceedings, and of course the state criminal defendants generally will not prevail on federal
defenses, so the number of cases that could skew the data is small.
254 See, e.g., NORMAN BLAIKIE, ANALYZING QUANTITATIVE DATA: FROM DESCRIPTION TO
EXPLANATION 167–68 (2003).
255 Id. at 167. Alternatively, one could also use supplemental data collection methods to
attempt to reduce the number of nonresponders altogether. The most logical tool to do so
would be to contact attorneys in the “unclear” decisions to inquire as to how their cases were
resolved. This would introduce another potential source of error—inaccurate information
conveyed by counsel—that would need to be accounted for, probably by contacting lawyers
for parties in “clear” decisions and comparing the reported results to the independent
research findings. This type of broad questionnaire survey is beyond the scope of my survey,
though I plan to undertake that sort of project in the future.
256 For example, a claimant might contest license suspension or revocation proceedings, and
although I cannot find a record of those proceedings, the license was actually suspended or
revoked. See, e.g., Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th
Cir. 1999); Healthcare Professions Profile for Faisal Amanatullah, COLO. DEP’T REG.
AGENCIES, https://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/cproweb/HPPS_Search_GUI.Search_Form
(choose “All License Types” on drop-down and hit “Continue”; type the license number
“25585” into the form and hit submit; click on the hyperlink “Amanatullah, Faisal F”) (last
visited Dec. 11, 2011) (license revoked on May 21, 1999). It is theoretically possible, how-
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of the total pro-abstention decisions—where there is simply no indication as to
how the federal claim was resolved. That is higher than one would like, but it is
sufficiently low that any bias should be tolerably small.257
Third, unlike other comparative studies that focus on particular types of
claims, this survey focuses on Younger decisions generally. The federal claims
at issue therefore run the gamut from facial constitutional challenges, to asapplied challenges, to due process challenges, to preemption claims, to federal
statutory claims. Professor Chemerinsky faulted Professors Solimine and
Walker’s 1983 study for aggregating First and Fourth Amendment and Equal
Protection claims, thus potentially obscuring disparities that might be observed
for particular types of claims, and that criticism certainly applies here.258 But
this objection is largely inapplicable given my purpose. My goal was to observe
what happens to federal claims from an empirical perspective after Younger
decisions—it should not matter whether the examined abstention decisions all
involve the same sorts of claims.259
Fourth, Chemerinsky cited several additional purported flaws in Solimine
and Walker’s study.260 As discussed below, a few of the criticisms are inapplicable to a review of post-abstention decisions showing a sizable discrepancy
between the resolution of federal claims in state or federal forums—but only a
few. Insofar as I do not discuss whether Chemerinsky’s objections are implicated by my survey, they are fully applicable.
Fifth, and finally, any study requiring the use of judgment when classifying or sorting data is susceptible to bias. Basically, this theory cautions that the
person conducting the study will be tempted to resolve close calls in a way that
supports his or her hypothesis.261 Further compounding that here is the fact that
many of the state decisions required extensive research to locate, meaning that
there is an opportunity to “look harder” for those outcomes that seem likely to
ever, that the asserted federal claims in this scenario might be successful but still insufficient
to avoid the sought discipline. That is exceedingly uncommon, however—of the 52 abstention decisions in which the federal claim prevailed, the Bendel case is the only one in which
a successful federal claimant lost on other grounds.
257 For example, if the remaining 49 “unclear” decisions were resolved at a rate similar to
that at which federal claims are resolved in federal court after an anti-abstention decisions,
that would increase the federal claim success rate to roughly 25 percent—and, of course, the
27 “unclear” pro-abstention decisions that could not have been resolved in favor of the federal claimant invariably include a substantial number of unsuccessful claims, which would
lower the success rate to near or below 20 percent. The important point is that even under
unrealistic assumptions about federal claim success rates in the “unclear” pro-abstention
decisions, state tribunals will still appear significantly more hostile to federal claims after
abstention proceedings than federal courts.
258 See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 266–67. This criticism is misplaced with respect to Solimine and Walker’s study, which specifically provides the results
for a number of different types of claims.
259 This also applies to the presumed criticism that it is inappropriate to compare federal
trial court and appellate court abstention decisions. See generally David W. Romero &
Francine Sanders Romero, Precedent, Parity, and Racial Discrimination: A Federal/State
Comparison of the Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809
(2003) (arguing that one should compare federal appellate courts to state appellate courts,
and federal district courts to state trial courts).
260 Supra Section II.C.
261 See Gerry, supra note 177, at 278.
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support preconceived notions. As Gerry noted in his study, one safeguard
against these biases is to devise clear and objective criteria governing search
parameters and data classification,262 and to fully disclose what those criteria
are. I hope that I did this sufficiently well in the preceding section.
C. Results
The above methodology identified 396 unique reported decisions from
1995 to 2006 that had the terms “Younger” and the applicable year in the three
applicable West headnotes; 368 of those involved a case that reached a concrete
Younger abstention decision. The court abstained in 51.6 percent (190 of 368)
of those, and it declined to abstain in 48.4 percent (178 of 368) of them.
This population of identified Younger abstention decisions includes 235
district court and 133 court of appeals decisions. There was a modest disparity
in how these trial and appellate courts resolved Younger abstention requests.
The former decided to abstain 47.7 percent (112 of 235) of the time, whereas
the latter issued a pro-Younger decision a more generous 58.6 percent (78 of
133) of the time. That difference is statistically insignificant to a 95 percent
confidence interval, though just barely so.263
In any event, I could determine what happened in the post-abstention proceedings for 60.0 percent of the pro-abstention decisions and for 79.2 percent
of the anti-abstention ones, for an aggregate total of 69.3 percent of all decisions. Of this, 32.1 percent of the pro-abstention decisions involve a situation in
which the federal claim was identifiably not decided; similarly, 22.5 percent of
the anti-abstention decisions involve post-abstention proceedings that could be
located but did not affirmatively resolve the claim. That leaves 27.9 percent of
the pro-abstention decisions and 56.7 percent of the anti-abstention decisions in
which the federal claim was identifiably resolved by a state tribunal or federal
court.264
With respect to this last group of abstention decisions, the bottom line is
that federal claimants prevailed 33.8 percent (52 of 154) of the time after
abstention proceedings. This aggregate figure encompasses a federal claim success rate of 34.0 percent (33 of 97) after abstention proceedings in federal trial
court, and 33.3 percent (19 of 57) after such proceedings in federal appellate
court.
262

Id.
The two-tail p-value for the difference in abstention request success rates in trial and
appellate courts is 0.0506. For this and all other p-value calculations, I used a Fisher exact
probability test.
264 Breaking out the statistics for the trial and appellate decisions, there was an unclear
ultimate resolution of the federal claim at issue in 43.8 percent of the pro-abstention trial
decisions, 34.6 percent of the pro-abstention appellate decisions, 16.3 percent of the antiabstention trial decisions, and 30.9 percent of the anti-abstention appellate decisions. The
federal claim was identifiably not decided in 33.0 percent of the pro-abstention trial decisions, 30.8 percent of the pro-abstention appellate decisions, 26.0 percent of the anti-abstention trial decisions, and 14.5 percent of the anti-abstention appellate decisions. The federal
claims therefore were identifiably resolved for 23.2 percent of the pro-abstention trial decisions, 34.6 percent of the pro-abstention appellate decisions, 57.7 percent of the anti-abstention trial decisions, and 54.5 percent of the anti-abstention appellate decisions.
263
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There was a significant disparity in how the federal claims were resolved
at the state and federal levels after abstention proceedings. Federal claims adjudicated in a state forum after a successful Younger abstention request prevailed
only 15.1 percent (8 of 53) of the time; conversely, federal claims succeeded in
federal court after a declined Younger request 43.6 percent (44 of 101) of the
time.265 Looking at only these decisions, then, federal claimants were about
2.89 times (or 189 percent) as likely to prevail in federal court as in a state
forum after Younger proceedings.266 This disparity is reflected at both the trial
and appellate levels. With respect to the former, federal claims were successful
in state tribunals after pro-abstention federal trial court decisions 11.5 percent
(3 of 26) of the time, and they were successful in federal court after anti-abstention trial court decisions 42.3 percent (30 of 71) of the time. With respect to the
latter, federal claims were successful at the state level after pro-abstention federal appellate decisions 18.5 percent (5 of 27) of the time, and they were successful 46.7 percent (14 of 30) of the time in federal court after an antiabstention federal appellate decision.267
It may be helpful to see a year-by-year breakdown of the Younger decisions. Tables presenting this data are included below. The first displays outcomes of pro-abstention decisions and records the number of anti-abstention
decisions:

265 This is ironic. As noted above, John Harris was ultimately successful at the state level,
thus making the initial Younger decision itself an outlier. See In re Harris, 97 Cal. Rptr. 844,
846 (1971).
266 If the “not decided” cases are included, the corresponding federal claim success rates are
7.0 percent (8 of 114) for state tribunals and 31.2 percent (44 of 141) for federal courts. For
these decisions, federal claimants were 4.46 times (346 percent) as likely to prevail in a
federal forum.
267 The differences in the ultimate federal claim success rates after pro- or anti-abstention
proceedings between federal trial and appellate courts are not statistically significant to any
reasonable confidence interval. The two-tail p-values for the difference in trial and appellate
outcomes for the pro- and anti-abstention decisions were 0.704 and 0.841, respectively.
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TABLE A—RESOLUTION OF ABSTENTION DECISIONS
Year

AA

AR

AN

AU

NA

Total

1995

1

1

3

12

17

34

1996

2

5

3

6

11

27

1997

1

3

5

6

11

26

1998

1

4

1

5

11

22

1999

0

3

1

9

12

25

2000

0

2

4

5

19

30

2001

0

5

8

9

21

43

2002

0

2

6

6

16

30

2003

2

5

7

2

13

29

2004

0

8

7

6

20

41

2005

1

4

10

3

19

37

2006

0

3

6

7

8

24

Total

8

45

61

76

178

368

Legend: AA—pro-abstention decisions involving ultimately successful federal claim; AR—
pro-abstention decisions involving ultimately unsuccessful claim; AN—pro-abstention
decisions involving not decided federal claim; AU—pro-abstention decisions involving
unclear federal claim; NA—anti-abstention decisions.

The next table does the reverse. It displays the outcomes of the antiabstention decisions and records the number of pro-abstention decisions:
TABLE B—RESOLUTION OF NON-ABSTENTION DECISIONS
Year

NA

NR

NN

NU

AB

Total

1995

6

7

3

1

17

34

1996

1

2

4

4

16

27

1997

3

3

4

1

15

26

1998

1

4

6

0

11

22

1999

5

2

3

2

13

25

2000

6

4

4

5

11

30

2001

5

7

0

9

22

43

2002

3

5

4

4

14

30

2003

2

4

5

2

16

29

2004

6

10

2

2

21

41

2005

4

7

3

5

18

37

2006

2

2

2

2

16

24

Total

44

57

40

37

190

368

Legend: NA—anti-abstention decisions involving ultimately successful federal claim;
NR—anti-abstention involving ultimately unsuccessful federal claim; NN—anti-abstention
decisions involving not decided federal claim; NU—anti-abstention decisions involving
unclear federal claim; AB—pro-abstention decisions.
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Finally, I used a 2 x 2 contingency table to perform some of the more
basic federal claim accepted/rejected calculations. It is set forth below:
TABLE C—2 x 2 CONTINGENCY TABLE DISPLAYING ABSTENTION/
NON-ABSTENTION AND FEDERAL CLAIM ACCEPTED/
REJECTED VARIABLES
Federal Claim Federal Claim
Ultimately
Ultimately
ACCEPTED
REJECTED

TOTAL

Pro-Abstention Decisions with Federal
Claim Resolved by a STATE
TRIBUNAL

8
(5.2%)

45
(29.2%)

53
(34.4%)

Anti-Abstention Decisions with Federal
Claim Resolved by a FEDERAL
COURT

44
(28.6%)

57
(37.0%)

101
(65.6%)

TOTAL

52
(33.8%)

102
(66.2%)

154
(100%)

Assuming a null hypothesis that federal and state forums will resolve postabstention federal claims at the same proportion, the z-score (or standard score)
for the difference in aggregate federal and state outcomes is 4.09, which suggests an observed difference that is more than four standard deviations greater
than expected.268 The two-tail p-value for the two samples is 0.000565, suggesting a 0.057 percent chance that the null hypothesis is true. All of this means
that the discrepancy between federal claim success rates in state and federal
forums after abstention litigation is statistically significant to a 99 percent confidence interval.269
This conclusion holds for both federal trial and appellate decisions, though
perhaps to a slightly lesser degree. The z-score for the difference in ultimate
federal claim success rates for the pro- and anti-abstention trial court decisions
therefore is 3.59;270 the two-tail p-value is 0.00689. This implies a statistically
significant difference to a 99 percent confidence level. The z-score for the difference in federal claim success rates following abstention proceedings at the
federal appellate level is 2.39;271 the two-tail p-value is 0.0475. This is statistically significant to a 95 percent (but not 99 percent) confidence interval, though
the less definitive conclusion is likely more a function of the small sample size
than any differences in the actual observed results.
268

The standard deviation for this difference is 6.97 percent, and the difference in federal
claim success rates is 28.5 percent. The standard deviation for the entire population of
abstention decisions involving an ultimately decided federal claim is 3.81 percent.
269 For a discussion of null hypotheses, calculating standard deviation, z-scores (or standard
scores) and p-values for the difference of two proportion subsamples, see DAVID A. KENNY,
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 77–78, 131–37 (1987).
270 The standard deviation for the difference is 8.57 percent; the difference in success rates
is 30.8 percent.
271 The standard deviation for the difference is 11.78 percent; the difference in success rates
is 28.2 percent.
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The question of whether these statistically significant differences are particularly important is a different matter. The correlation for the two groups of
federal abstention decisions (calculated by determining the phi-coefficient) is
0.286. That value falls in the “weak” correlation category, though at the very
high end of it. It implies a modest degree of correlation between the forum and
the resolution of the federal claim. This aggregate result is consistent with what
is observed at federal trial and appellate levels.272
So what does this mean? First, regardless of whether one is looking at
federal trial or appellate abstention decisions or an aggregate, the observed difference in federal claim success rates resolved after Younger proceedings in
federal courts versus state tribunals is highly significant and almost certainly
must be attributed to something other than statistical noise. There is something
going on, in other words, to make a federal claimant seem substantially less
likely to prevail in a state forum rather than federal court after Younger litigation. The correlation between the two variables is weak-to-moderate, however,
meaning that the relationship between the post-abstention forum and federal
claim success is not strong.
That makes good sense. Federal claimants are unlikely to prevail in state
tribunals after a pro-abstention decision, but they are also unlikely to prevail in
federal court after an anti-abstention decision. The fact is, whether or not a
litigant is asserting or opposing a federal claim has a more significant impact
on his or her odds of success than the forum in which the claim is proceeding.
It generally is preferable to be a federal claimant in federal court after an unsuccessful abstention request than to be a federal claimant in a state forum after
abstention; but even better is to be the party opposing the federal claim, no
matter in which court. That says the most about who is likely to prevail.
To put some numbers on it, if one were betting on how a federal claim
after a Younger dispute was resolved, knowing only that a particular party
would be litigating in his or her preferred forum (but not whether he or she was
the federal claimant) would increase the chances of predicting success from a
coin flip to 57.8 percent.273 Knowing whether the party was the federal claimant, but not whether he or she would be litigating in a preferred forum, would
increase the accuracy of the prediction to 66.2 percent.274 Thus, knowledge of
who is asserting the federal claim is roughly twice as valuable as knowledge of
the outcome of abstention proceedings. And indeed, when looking only at the
variables of whether a litigant is asserting or opposing a federal claim and
whether the litigant was successful, the correlation coefficient increases to
0.325, which falls in the “medium” correlation category. This confirms the
foregoing intuition: the difficulty of prevailing as a federal claimant is at least
modestly more important to the outcome of post-abstention proceedings than
whether the claim is decided in a federal or state forum.

272 The phi-coefficient for the trial and appellate court abstention decisions are 0.287 and
0.298, respectively.
273 This is because the party that was successful in the abstention litigation was successful
on the merits 89 out of 154 times. See supra Table C.
274 The party resisting the federal claim was successful 102 out of 154 times. Id.
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SURVEY RESULTS

A. Comparisons to Other Empirical Parity Studies
Any comparison of these results to other state-federal empirical comparative studies must begin with Professors Solimine and Walker’s 1983 article. It
should be noted from the outset, however, that comparing my results to theirs
has an apples-to-oranges quality. The authors only looked at First Amendment,
Fourth Amendment, and Equal Protection claims, whereas I looked at all federal claims implicated by Younger abstention proceedings.
In any event, the first thing that stands out is the similarity in the success
rates of federal claimants in federal court. This Article concluded above that
such litigants are successful 43.6 percent of the time.275 The Solimine and
Walker study found a remarkably similar success rate of 41.7 percent.276 The
35.8 percent success rate for all federal claims observed by Solimine and
Walker is also reasonably close to the 33.8 percent rate found by this Article.277
The similarities stop with respect to federal claims decided by state tribunals, however. Whereas Solimine and Walker found that the federal claimant
prevailed in these cases 31.4 percent of the time,278 this Article observed a 15.1
percent success rate279—less than half as much. While the Solimine and
Walker study suggests that federal courts are 32.8 percent more likely to rule in
favor of a federal claim than are state courts, I found that a federal court after
declining abstention is 189 percent more likely to side with the federal claimant
than is a state tribunal after abstention. Obviously, this is a significant discrepancy.280 This Article’s finding is not much more of an outlier than Solimine
and Walker’s conclusion, however—they calculated a z-score of 3.62,281 indicating a difference between the success rates in state and federal court a little
more than three-and-a-half standard deviations greater than expected. This is
only slightly less than my z-score of 4.09.282
My survey results were also somewhat different with respect to the relationship between the particular forum in which a federal claim is being adjudicated and the likelihood of success of that claim. As noted above, my study
observed a (rounded) correlation of 0.29 between the forum and federal claim275

Supra Section III.C.
See Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation, supra note 26, at 240. The authors of
that study rounded their results to the nearest percentile in their article; my analysis uses
results rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent, which Professor Solimine has used in other
forums. See Solimine, Future of Parity, supra note 147, at 1465. In any event, the p-value
for the difference between their federal court results and my federal court results is 0.823,
which is not statistically significant.
277 Id. at 239. The p-value for this difference in overall federal claim success rates is 0.699,
which is not statistically significant.
278 See id. at 240.
279 Supra Section III.C.
280 The z-score (or standard score) for this difference in our state forum results is 3.09,
indicating that it falls a little more than three standard deviations from the mean. The two-tail
p-value is 0.0182. This means that the difference is statistically significant to a 95 percent
(but not 99 percent) confidence interval.
281 Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation, supra note 26, at 241 n.124.
282 The seeming inconsistency is almost certainly explained by their much larger sample
size.
276
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ant success, which fell at the very high end of the “weak” category.283 Solimine
and Walker did not address the issue of correlation in their article, but in a
subsequent 1999 book update they calculated a phi-coefficient of 0.11 between
the forum where a federal claim is brought and its success rate.284 Although
this also falls into the “weak” correlation category, it does so just barely, and it
is less than half as strong as the correlation observed in the abstention context.285 Thus, Solimine and Walker’s findings differed substantially from my
results because: (a) they found federal claimants to be much more successful in
state court on an absolute basis; (b) they found federal claimants in state court
to be much more successful relative to claimants in federal court; and (c) they
observed much less correlation between the forum and the disposition of the
claim.
The other studies comparing state and federal court performance are similarly inapposite. Solimine examined the outcome of section 1983 claims in state
and federal court in his 1991 article and found no difference in how the two
forums were resolving these claims.286 Gerry reached a similar conclusion in
his 1999 article comparing how state and federal courts were interpreting and
applying Nollan.287 These results obviously are inconsistent with my finding
that federal and state forums appear fundamentally different in their disposition
of federal claims asserted in post-abstention proceedings.
With respect to Solimine’s study, it should be noted from the outset that he
actually found a state court success rate that is roughly similar to my results—
18.5 percent to 15.1 percent—though, of course, the specific type of claim that
was his focus makes direct comparison impossible.288 The main discrepancy
lies with his miniscule observed chance of success (10.5 percent) in federal
court.289 This likely is due to statistical noise. Solimine only examined nineteen
cases to understand how federal courts were resolving section 1983 claims.290
Yet with that small sample size, the difference between his observed results and
any success rate between 0 percent and approximately 25 percent would be
statistically insignificant. There simply were not enough federal cases studied
to be able to draw meaningful conclusions about how courts were treating section 1983 claims, except in the roughest or broadest sense.
A different phenomenon likely explains Gerry’s findings. As Professor
Pinello argues, observations derived from takings lawsuits should not be gener283

Supra Section III.C.
See SOLIMINE & WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS, supra note 156, at 48.
285 A general rule is that a correlation coefficient under 0.1 implies no correlation; a correlation between 0.1 and 0.3 implies a “weak” correlation; a correlation between 0.3 and 0.5
implies a “medium” correlation; and a correlation coefficient greater than 0.5 implies a
“strong” correlation. See KENNY, supra note 269, at 133.
286 See Solimine, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 198, at 418.
287 See Gerry, supra note 177, at 293.
288 See Solimine, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 198, at 416 (Table One).
289 Id. at 418 (Table Two).
290 Id. One should not fault Solimine too much. He mainly was interested in how state
courts were resolving the § 1983 claims, and just included federal cases as a benchmark.
And my own sample of pro-abstention cases with an identifiably decided federal claim is
relatively small, so this observation smacks of pot-kettle criticism.
284
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alized to other sorts of federal constitutional claims.291 Gerry himself acknowledged that the takings claims at issue in Nollan and the subsequent state and
federal cases that he examined involved an individual right that is qualitatively
different from typical constitutional claims (e.g., First or Fourteenth Amendment claims).292 Unlike those prototypical constitutional challenges, a takings
lawsuit generally does not involve an individual asserting an unpopular or
counter-majoritarian claim against a state or local government; to the contrary,
it often involves local interests challenging unpopular federal or state
actions.293 This might explain why he observed an equally receptive treatment
of federal claims in state and federal forums.
B. Possible Explanations
So if federal claimants experience a success rate in post-abstention proceedings in federal court that is nearly three times as high as their counterparts
litigating before state tribunals, what could explain the difference? The first and
most obvious hypothesis is that this much higher success rate is evidence of a
strong disparity between federal and state courts, at least in the Younger context. There may be an argument that a 15.1 percent chance of success is still
evidence of weak parity, but it is not very persuasive. At the very least, this
invokes the observation that the mere existence of some degree of parity is
insufficient to justify the federal doctrines that rely on an assumption of state
court adequacy; in that case, one also must determine precisely how strong or
weak that parity is.294 The substantial discrepancy observed in this survey
surely must fall on the “not strong enough” side of the line.
This parity-based conclusion could take one of two forms. The first—the
broad form—is that these results show that state tribunals generally cannot be
trusted to adjudicate federal claims at the same level of competency as federal
courts. This should be rejected out of hand. My survey is a relatively small
study commingling heterogeneous types of claims in front of all levels of state
and federal courts and administrative tribunals. There certainly is no reason that
this study should trump the much more comprehensive and uniform studies
done by Professors Solimine and Walker and similarly-minded empiricists.
The alternative narrow parity-based conclusion is more plausible. This
theory interprets the survey results as constituting reasonable evidence that
there is insufficient parity specifically—and solely—in the context of postYounger proceedings. In other words, regardless of whether state forums provide an adequate and unbiased opportunity to litigate federal claims generally,
they do not give federal claimants a sufficient chance of success in cases where
the claims get channeled to them following Younger abstention. This theory
certainly is consistent with my results, and although I ultimately think that it is
too strong to be justified, it certainly warrants discussion.
291

See PINELLO, supra note 163, at 108.
See Gerry, supra note 177, at 286–87.
293 Id. at 287. Gerry suggests that the conventional wisdom is that judges who are more
sympathetic to takings claims are less sympathetic to other types of constitutional claims.
294 See Herman, supra note 147, at 651–52.
292
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As an initial observation, this theory avoids or negates many of the empirical parity criticisms asserted by Professor Chemerinsky and others. Much of
their criticism ultimately amounts to the observation that the Solimine and
Walker study compared state decisions that skewed in favor of federal constitutional claims relative to all such claims that were or could be brought,295 and
vice versa with respect to federal decisions.296 However, an empirical finding
that federal claimants are disproportionately unlikely to succeed during postabstention proceedings in a state forum would only be underscored when
adjusted for these criticisms.
Furthermore, it would be straightforward to evaluate this theory with additional research by being as exhaustive as possible. The remaining West headnotes could be searched, text searches could be run in the decisions themselves
to include unreported Younger decisions that currently are excluded, and significant resources could be devoted to researching the outcome of post-abstention
proceedings in state tribunals—all from 1971 to the present. The goal would
not be to find a representative sample of reported Younger decisions (as mine
was); it would be to come close to finding all such Younger cases. Then, at the
end of the day, one probably could draw firm conclusions about the broad universe of all or nearly all Younger decisions, which in turn might provide a
powerful argument about the justification of the fundamental assumption of
state court adequacy in the context of the doctrine.
The main problem with the narrow disparity hypothesis is that it is not
easy to imagine a mechanism explaining why post-abstention state tribunals
treat federal claims so differently than when they are brought outside the
abstention context. One possibility echoes the observations of Professors Althouse and Friedman: cases that qualify for Younger abstention (by satisfying
the Middlesex test) are especially unsuited to support the assumption of state
forum adequacy because they necessarily involve an important state interest.297
My results could reflect that basic tension. Under this view, federal claimants
prevail less frequently in state forums after abstention proceedings than they do
outside of that context because their claims often infringe upon an important
state interest. One flaw in this theory, however, is that it is undercut by the
expansion of the second Younger requirement to encompass virtually any type
of state enforcement or similar proceeding.298 It seems counterintuitive to contend that state tribunals are especially reluctant to rule for federal claimants
when doing so might adversely affect an important state interest, but then at the
same time conclude that virtually any state enforcement or similar proceeding
involves such an important interest.
295

Supra Section II.C. To summarize, Chemerinsky argued that Solimine and Walker likely
observed a misleadingly small discrepancy because (1) only the strongest constitutional
claims would be filed and proceed to judgment and appeal, (2) state appellate courts studied
would be more solicitous than trial courts to federal claimants, and (3) state statutes were
more likely to be egregiously unconstitutional than their federal counterparts. Id.
296 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 47, at 262.
297 Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 47, at 1083–84; Friedman, Revisionist Theory,
supra note 32, at 542–43.
298 Supra Section I.B.2.

Fall 2011]

YOUNGER ABSTENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

49

The second flaw in the Althouse/Friedman explanation for the narrow disparity hypothesis is alluded to in NOPSI. Although the generic type of proceeding that is the basis for abstention must implicate an important state interest, the
actual litigation need not.299 And indeed, a cursory review of the Younger decisions included in my analysis shows that many are mundane licensing or zoning disputes that hardly involve a direct important state interest on their face.
Take the shuttle service example from the note above, for example. While
broadly regulating intrastate transportation is an important state interest, it
seems highly unlikely that a state tribunal would be reluctant to rule against the
state in a garden-variety limousine licensing dispute simply because this
generic type of proceeding, in the aggregate, ultimately implicates an important
state concern (i.e., the regulation of commercial motor carriers).300
Another theory that might explain the post-abstention disparity is that the
state or one of its agencies typically is a party in the proceedings, and under
those circumstances, a state forum might be especially likely to favor its sister
governmental branch.301 But the sorts of constitutional claims examined by
Solimine and Walker also invariably involved a large number of state defendants, and they did not observe an exaggerated sense of favoritism. Indeed, their
results for criminal cases, which necessarily involve the state, do not suggest
any statistically significant difference in federal and state court behavior.302
Nor did Gerry find a significant difference,303 and he was looking at takings
claims in which a state or local government typically has a vested financial
interest. If a state court ever has an incentive to disproportionately favor state
litigants, it should be in that context, where state funds are at stake.
And there is a more fundamental reason to avoid drawing a parity-based
conclusion. I believe that another hypothesis, unrelated to any notion that federal courts are more or less sympathetic to federal claims, is more likely to
explain why federal claimants seem disproportionately unlikely to succeed after
abstention decisions. Most empirical parity studies start with the assumption
that the forum is the important variable in the analysis; indeed, these studies are
usually intended to investigate if the forum is what is driving a potential difference in federal claim success rates. That certainly was my focus when beginning this project.
But what if this is the wrong way of looking at it, at least with respect to
abstention decisions? What if the important variable is not whether post-abstention proceedings are conducted in federal court or a state tribunal, but instead,
something else closely correlated with it?304 This led me to question whether
299 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350,
365 (1989).
300 See supra note 80.
301 See Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 148, at 333–35 (arguing that state courts are
biased in favor of state litigants).
302 See Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation, supra note 26, at 242 (Table III).
303 See Gerry, supra note 177, at 285.
304 This invokes the classic observation that ice cream sales are correlated with the crime
rate. These sales do not cause crime—they merely are correlated with a variable (hot
weather) that does. See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, Comparative Cause and Effect: Consumer
Insolvency and the Eroding Social Safety Net, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 563, 564 (2006)
(describing phenomenon); see also BAKEMAN, supra note 225, at 58 (noting that a major
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the post-abstention forum might be a close proxy for another variable that could
have a more significant and explainable impact on observed federal claim success rates after abstention proceedings. The answer, of course, should be clear:
whether a Younger dispute keeps a federal claimant in federal court or funnels
him or her to a state forum corresponds nearly exactly with whether the federal
claimant wins the abstention dispute in the first place. Perhaps who wins the
abstention dispute, not where that party gets sent, is the most influential variable in the post-abstention context. In other words, although one certainly would
like to be litigating in his or her preferred forum, it is not as important as
winning the legal battle required to get there.
Three possible mechanisms could explain this. The first is the most obvious. Perhaps the federal judge, in deciding whether to abstain under Younger, is
signaling what he or she thinks about the merits of the claim.305 In other words,
a judge who thinks that a federal claim seems promising might subconsciously
be inclined to keep the case, especially if abstention is a close call—and vice
versa if the claim feels untenable. This “cherry picking” use of abstention
would amount to an implicit version of the “patently unconstitutional” or
“facially conclusive” Younger exceptions that courts now use to decline abstention when all Middlesex requirements are met.306
The second explanation for the possible correlation between abstention
success and prevailing in the ultimate dispute is also straightforward. Perhaps
victory in an abstention dispute is a reasonable proxy for the quality of litigants
and their counsel. Abstention disputes are complex, technical, and hotly contested. Attorneys believe that the forum can provide a significant advantage,307
and they will fight for it like dogs. Given the significant attention devoted to
abstention litigation, prevailing in those proceedings might indicate that the
winner and his or her lawyers are more skilled than their opponents on average.
This should carry over to the merits of the case.308
drawback in observational or descriptive studies is the possibility that one is observing correlation with an unknown variable).
305 It is no secret that judges can use preliminary rulings to signal to the losing party that
“his or her resources might be put to better use than pursuing the litigation.” Jack M. Beermann, Federal Court Self-Preservation and Terri Schiavo, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 553, 566–67
(2006).
306 See, e.g., Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, 377
F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying “facially conclusive” exception); Woodfeathers, Inc. v.
Wash. Cnty., Or., 180 F.3d 1017, 1021–22 (9th Cir.1999) (preemption of county ordinance
not so “readily apparent” as to defeat Younger abstention). But see Cedar Rapids Cellular
Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to rule on whether the
exception exists).
307 See, e.g., Marvell, supra note 193, at 1371–72 (discussing attorneys’ views on federal
and state forums in student litigation context).
308 As noted above, the effect of this knowledge is measurable. Disregarding the “not
decided” decisions, my results indicate that the winner of an abstention dispute prevails in
post-abstention proceedings 57.8 percent (89 of 154) of the time. This overall success rate
obscures the stark difference between winning and losing, though. If the federal claimant
successfully opposes abstention, his or her chances of success increase 28.5 percentage
points from 15.1 percent (8 of 53) to 43.6 percent (44 of 101). Parties seeking abstention
experience an identical increase if they win during abstention proceedings.
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The final possibility for why success or failure during Younger proceedings could affect the resolution of the federal claim independent of the ultimate
forum is more behavioral. Perhaps parties or their counsel, having viewed
abstention litigation as crucial to success on the merits, are inclined to give up
on their lawsuit if they lose the forum dispute. In this self-perpetuating cycle,
litigants opposing abstention, for example, might spend so much time and
resources trying to avoid relegation to a perceived hostile state forum that when
it happens they are convinced that their claim will not receive a fair hearing and
thus pursue it only halfheartedly. At the very least, private litigants usually
have more limited resources than their state opponents, so they might be more
likely to abandon their federal claims if forced to pursue them elsewhere after a
lengthy and costly abstention dispute.309
These hypotheses implicate an extensive field of empirical legal studies
that has developed outside of the abstention and parity contexts. Several scholars have examined what litigation factors have the largest impact on case outcomes.310 These academics observe that perhaps the biggest predictor of
ultimate success in complicated litigation is winning or losing important pretrial motions.311 Their work on the relationship between removal efforts and
litigation success seems particularly relevant to the question addressed by this
Article, given that abstention also involves the impact of a forum dispute on
case outcomes. In Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal
System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, Professors Kevin Clermont and
Eisenberg conclude that a plaintiff’s odds of success in diversity jurisdiction
cases start at 71 percent if the lawsuit is brought directly but drop to 34 percent
if the case reaches federal court through removal.312 They attribute the decrease
in part to forum effects, in part to weakness of removed cases, and in part to
inferior counsel as demonstrated by the failure to avoid removal, though they
generally minimize the role that the last of these could play.313 They controlled
for known variables and concluded that removal decreased a plaintiff’s odds
from an even 50 percent to 35 percent, with eleven percentage points of the
drop attributed to the forum and the remainder attributed to case weakness and
quality of counsel.314 Perhaps my results reflect this same dynamic.
309

I am grateful to Professor Solimine for suggesting this theory.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 119, 140 (2002) (describing current research); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1919 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont, Litigation
Realities Redux] (same); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes
Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 599 (1998) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Case Outcomes].
311 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 532–33
(1990) (“[D]efendants’ success rate at the pretrial motion stage is by far the biggest factor in
describing the decline in plaintiffs’ overall success rate.”).
312 Clermont & Eisenberg, Case Outcomes, supra note 310, at 593.
313 Id. at 603–05. Eisenberg and Clermont note that counsel quality likely has a limited
effect because removal often cannot be avoided. The same applies here, though to a lesser
degree.
314 Id. at 606–07. This result—that removal to a presumably unfavorable federal forum
decreases a plaintiff’s odds of success by 11 percent—obviously is a significant one, and it
suggests that litigants are quite good at judging where they will have the most success.
310
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One possible hitch in the first two of these theories is that if prevailing
during Younger proceedings signaled a likelihood of success on the merits, one
would expect to see a depressed federal claim success rate in post-abstention
state proceedings, and vice versa in federal court after a failed abstention
request.315 The former certainly is consistent with my results, but the latter is
not. As discussed above,316 I observed a federal claim success rate that is consistent with what Solimine and Walker found in their study (43.6 percent to
41.7 percent). This tentatively suggests that there is no mechanism at play funneling more meritorious claims to federal court. I have a few theories that
might explain this phenomenon;317 however, I looked at a different universe of
claims than those authors, and as such, it would be pointless and premature to
speculate as to why my observed federal claim success rate in post-abstention
proceedings in federal court does not appear disproportionately high.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigators should not care why federal claims seem to get a disproportionately hostile treatment in state forums after Younger proceedings than they do
in federal court, or than they do outside of the abstention context. Why would
trial lawyers care if the explanation for this discrepancy is that state tribunals
cannot adequately adjudicate these sorts of cases, or if it is because an abstention victory signals that a party has an advantage in the post-abstention proceedings? Attorneys litigating this issue should have the same goal no matter
what: win the abstention dispute or their client will probably lose the case. But
how is this different than it always has been? Lawyers fight over Younger
abstention as if the case is on the line for good reason—it usually is. My survey
results should only confirm that conventional wisdom.
The question is more important and interesting from an academic perspective. The Younger doctrine is premised on a fundamental assumption that state
tribunals can adequately resolve federal claims. If it turns out that this is not
true—because state forums are hostile to federal claimants in the abstention
context—then the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine are baseless, and it
should be restructured. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would ever reverse
the prior expansion of the Younger doctrine, even in the face of overwhelming
Notably, Clermont and Eisenberg also have examined the effects of venue transfer, observing a similar phenomenon. They conclude that plaintiffs prevail in 58 percent of all nontransferred and 29 percent of all transferred cases. Controlling for known variables, losing a
transfer dispute seems to decrease a plaintiff’s odds in a case from 50 percent to 40 percent.
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511–12 (1995); see also Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux,
supra note 310, at 1927–28.
315 It is possible that private litigants, with their limited resources, might be more likely to
give up after an adverse abstention decision than are their state opponents, and as such, the
third hypothesis is reconcilable with the observation that federal claim success rates appear
depressed in state forums but not elevated in federal ones.
316 See supra Section III.C.
317 For example, the influx of Reagan and Bush I and II appointees may have made the
federal judiciary less receptive to federal claims over the past few decades. Under this theory, my 43.6 percent federal court success rate actually is elevated—it is just that the baseline success rate is lower now than when Solimine and Walker conducted their study.
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evidence that it was unwarranted.318 But if the Court ever decided to take up
the topic again, it could do so knowing whether the fundamental assumptions
upon which the doctrine is based are suspect. If, on the other hand, outside
factors only make it look like federal claimants are being unfairly treated at the
state level, then this is a different matter. Perhaps nothing needs to be done—
but we need to be aware of the phenomenon.
This Article is intended to start the conversation about what actually happens when courts abstain (or not) in favor of parallel state proceedings. My
survey was not exhaustive, but I plan to do more comprehensive study in the
future. And while there will probably always be post-abstention proceedings
hidden from public view, someone with substantial resources likely could
determine the disposition of the vast majority of federal claims. We will begin
to have a full picture about what happens after Younger abstention at that point,
and the debate will be less about how the federal claims are ultimately resolved,
and more about whether any discrepancy between success rates in state and
federal court is attributed to a lack of parity, or to the litigation advantage that
the winners of pretrial matters oftentimes have, or to some other factor. This
last inquiry, in my view, is the most interesting one. Hopefully this Article will
provide the impetus for someone to try to answer it.

318

See Herman, supra note 147, at 655 n.17.

